IDEAS home Printed from
MyIDEAS: Login to save this paper or follow this series

The Heterogeneity of Default Costs: Evidence from Recent Sovereign Debt Crises

  • Markus Jorra


    (University of Giessen)

This paper examines the costs of recent sovereign defaults using synthetic control methods, a novel econometric technique based on comparative case studies. Evidence on the e ects of debt crises is thus presented on a case-by-case basis, uncovering large variations in country-speci c experiences. Our estimates of cumulated output losses, e.g., range between 8.5% and 23% depending on the considered default episode. Further di erences concern the persistence and likely causes of these costs. In particular, our results are consistent with the selective use of direct trade sanctions as punishment for sovereign defaults.

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL:
File Function: First version, 2011
Download Restriction: no

Paper provided by Philipps-Universität Marburg, Faculty of Business Administration and Economics, Department of Economics (Volkswirtschaftliche Abteilung) in its series MAGKS Papers on Economics with number 201151.

in new window

Length: 41 pages
Date of creation: 2011
Date of revision:
Publication status: Forthcoming in
Handle: RePEc:mar:magkse:201151
Contact details of provider: Postal: Universitätsstraße 25, 35037 Marburg
Phone: 06421/28-1722
Fax: 06421/28-4858
Web page:

More information through EDIRC

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

as in new window
  1. Enrique G. Mendoza & Vivian Z. Yue, 2011. "A General Equilibrium Model of Sovereign Default and Business Cycles," NBER Working Papers 17151, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  2. Valerie Cerra & Sweta C. Saxena, 2005. "Growth Dynamics: The Myth of Economic Recovery," Macroeconomics 0508008, EconWPA.
  3. Eduardo A. Cavallo & Ilan Noy & Juan Pantano & Sebastián Galiani, 2010. "Catastrophic Natural Disasters and Economic Growth," IDB Publications (Working Papers) 6818, Inter-American Development Bank.
  4. Tommaso Nannicini & Andreas Billmeier, 2011. "Economies in Transition: How Important Is Trade Openness for Growth?," Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics, Department of Economics, University of Oxford, vol. 73(3), pages 287-314, 06.
  5. La Porta, Rafael & Lopez-de-Silanes, Florencio & Shleifer, Andrei & Vishny, Robert, 1999. "The Quality of Government," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 15(1), pages 222-79, April.
  6. Andrew K. Rose, 2001. "One reason countries pay their debts: renegotiation and international trade," Staff Reports 142, Federal Reserve Bank of New York.
  7. Herschel I. Grossman & John B. Van Huyck, 1985. "Sovereign Debt as a Contingent Claim: Excusable Default, Repudiation, and Reputation," NBER Working Papers 1673, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  8. Davide Furceri & Aleksandra Zdzienicka, 2011. "How Costly Are Debt Crises?," IMF Working Papers 11/280, International Monetary Fund.
  9. Cavallo, Alberto F. & Cavallo, Eduardo A., 2010. "Are crises good for long-term growth? The role of political institutions," Journal of Macroeconomics, Elsevier, vol. 32(3), pages 838-857, September.
  10. Hutchison, Michael M. & Noy, Ilan & Wang, Lidan, 2010. "Fiscal and monetary policies and the cost of sudden stops," Journal of International Money and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 29(6), pages 973-987, October.
  11. Jose Vicente Martinez and Guido Sandleris, 2008. "Is it Punishment? Sovereign Defaults and the Decline in Trade," Business School Working Papers 2008-01, Universidad Torcuato Di Tella.
  12. Jonathan Eaton & Mark Gersovitz, 1981. "Debt with Potential Repudiation: Theoretical and Empirical Analysis," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 48(2), pages 289-309.
  13. Kohlscheen, Emanuel, 2005. "Sovereign Risk : Constitutions Rule," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 731, University of Warwick, Department of Economics.
  14. Stiglitz, Joseph E., 2000. "Capital Market Liberalization, Economic Growth, and Instability," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 28(6), pages 1075-1086, June.
  15. Juan Carlos Hatchondo & Leonardo Martinez & Horacio Sapriza, 2009. "Heterogeneous Borrowers In Quantitative Models Of Sovereign Default," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 50(4), pages 1129-1151, November.
  16. Alberto Abadie & Javier Gardeazabal, 2003. "The Economic Costs of Conflict: A Case Study of the Basque Country," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 93(1), pages 113-132, March.
  17. Yeyati, Eduardo Levy & Panizza, Ugo, 2011. "The elusive costs of sovereign defaults," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 94(1), pages 95-105, January.
  18. Cruces, Juan J. & Trebesch, Christoph, 2013. "Sovereign defaults: The price of haircuts," Munich Reprints in Economics 20036, University of Munich, Department of Economics.
  19. Carlos O. Arteta & Galina Hale, 2006. "Sovereign debt crises and credit to the private sector," Working Paper Series 2006-21, Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco.
  20. Eduardo Borensztein & Ugo Panizza, 2009. "The Costs of Sovereign Default," IMF Staff Papers, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 56(4), pages 683-741, November.
  21. Daniel Leigh & Andrea Pescatori & Jaime Guajardo, 2011. "Expansionary Austerity New International Evidence," IMF Working Papers 11/158, International Monetary Fund.
  22. Alfaro, Laura & Kanczuk, Fabio, 2005. "Sovereign debt as a contingent claim: a quantitative approach," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 65(2), pages 297-314, March.
  23. Nauro F Campos & Yuko Kinoshita, 2010. "Structural Reforms, Financial Liberalization, and Foreign Direct Investment," IMF Staff Papers, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 57(2), pages 326-365, June.
  24. Barro, Robert J. & Lee, Jong Wha, 2013. "A new data set of educational attainment in the world, 1950–2010," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 104(C), pages 184-198.
  25. W. A. Naude & W. F. Krugell, 2007. "Investigating geography and institutions as determinants of foreign direct investment in Africa using panel data," Applied Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 39(10), pages 1223-1233.
  26. Miguel Fuentes & Diego Saravia, 2009. "Sovereing Defaulters: Do International Capital Markets Punish Them?," Working Papers Central Bank of Chile 515, Central Bank of Chile.
  27. Abadie, Alberto & Diamond, Alexis & Hainmueller, Jens, 2010. "Synthetic Control Methods for Comparative Case Studies: Estimating the Effect of California’s Tobacco Control Program," Journal of the American Statistical Association, American Statistical Association, vol. 105(490), pages 493-505.
  28. Oya Celasun & Philipp Harms, 2011. "Boon Or Burden? The Effect Of Private Sector Debt On The Risk Of Sovereign Default In Developing Countries," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 49(1), pages 70-88, 01.
  29. Gaston Gelos & Guido Sandleris & Ratna Sahay, 2004. "Sovereign Borrowing by Developing Countries: What Determines Market Access?," IMF Working Papers 04/221, International Monetary Fund.
  30. Ugo Panizza & Federico Sturzenegger & Jeromin Zettelmeyer, 2009. "The Economics and Law of Sovereign Debt and Default," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 47(3), pages 651-98, September.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:mar:magkse:201151. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Bernd Hayo)

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis using RePEc data.