Sovereign Risk: Constitutions Rule
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- Kohlscheen, Emanuel, 2005. "Sovereign Risk : Constitutions Rule," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 731, University of Warwick, Department of Economics.
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More about this item
Keywordsdebt; crises; political institution; commitment; constitution; parliamentary; presidential;
- F30 - International Economics - - International Finance - - - General
- F34 - International Economics - - International Finance - - - International Lending and Debt Problems
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