Media bias and electoral competition
This paper examines the incentives of ideological media outlets to acquire costly information in a context of asymmetric information between political parties and voters. We consider two market structures: a monopoly media market and a duopoly one. We show that if each party has the support of a media, either party has the same probability of winning the election. However, if just one of the parties has the support of the media, the results might well change, as this party will get into office with a higher probability than the other party. We also analyze voters' welfare in this context and show that the important aspect is whether a media industry exists, and not the number of media outlets.
|Date of creation:||Mar 2008|
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