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Media capture in a democracy: The role of wealth concentration

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  • Corneo, Giacomo

Abstract

Since objective news coverage is vital to democracy, captured media can seriously distort collective decisions. The current paper develops a voting model where citizens are uncertain about the welfare eþects induced by alternative policy options and derive information about those eþects from the mass media. The media might however secretly collude with interest groups in order to in.uence the public opinion. In the case of voting over the level of a productivity-enhancing public bad, it is shown that an increase in the concentration of firm ownership makes the occurrence of media bias more likely. Although media bias is not always welfare worsening, conditions for it to raise welfare are restrictive.

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Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Public Economics.

Volume (Year): 90 (2006)
Issue (Month): 1-2 (January)
Pages: 37-58

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Handle: RePEc:eee:pubeco:v:90:y:2006:i:1-2:p:37-58
Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/505578

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
  • H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods
  • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior

References listed on IDEAS
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  1. Besley, Timothy J. & Prat, Andrea, 2002. "Handcuffs for the Grabbing Hand? Media Capture and Government Accountability," CEPR Discussion Papers 3132, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  2. Roemer, J.E., 1991. "Would Economic Democracy Decrease the Amount of Public Bads?," Papers 376, California Davis - Institute of Governmental Affairs.
  3. Tim Groseclose & Jeffrey Milyo, 2005. "A Measure of Media Bias," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 120(4), pages 1191-1237, November.
  4. Sendhil Mullainathan & Andrei Shleifer, 2002. "Media Bias," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers 1981, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research.
  5. Chan, Jimmy & Suen, Wing, 2009. "Media as watchdogs: The role of news media in electoral competition," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 53(7), pages 799-814, October.
  6. Djankov, Simeon & et al, 2003. "Who Owns the Media?," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 46(2), pages 341-81, October.
  7. Sendhil Mullainathan & Andrei Shleifer, 2005. "The Market for News," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 95(4), pages 1031-1053, September.
  8. Benabou, R. & Laroque, G., 1989. "Using Privileged Information To Manipulate Markets: Insiders, Gurus, And Credibility," Working papers 513, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
  9. Puglisi Riccardo, 2011. "Being The New York Times: the Political Behaviour of a Newspaper," The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 11(1), pages 1-34, April.
  10. V. Crawford & J. Sobel, 2010. "Strategic Information Transmission," Levine's Working Paper Archive 544, David K. Levine.
  11. Stefano DellaVigna & Ethan Kaplan, 2006. "The Fox News Effect: Media Bias and Voting," NBER Working Papers 12169, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  12. John C. Harsanyi & Reinhard Selten, 1972. "A Generalized Nash Solution for Two-Person Bargaining Games with Incomplete Information," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 18(5-Part-2), pages 80-106, January.
  13. David Str�mberg, 2004. "Mass Media Competition, Political Competition, and Public Policy," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 71(1), pages 265-284.
  14. Harsanyi, John C, 1995. "Games with Incomplete Information," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 85(3), pages 291-303, June.
  15. Bergstrom, Ted C, 1979. " When Does Majority Rule Supply Public Goods Efficiently?," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 81(2), pages 216-26.
  16. Baron, David P., 2004. "Persistent Media Bias," Research Papers 1845r, Stanford University, Graduate School of Business.
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Blog mentions

As found by EconAcademics.org, the blog aggregator for Economics research:
  1. Inequality and the media
    by Mainly Macro in Mainly Macro on 2014-03-09 19:54:00
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Cited by:

  1. Georgy Egorov & Sergei Guriev & Konstantin Sonin, 2006. "Media Freedom, Bureaucratic Incentives, and the Resource Curse," Working Papers w0063, Center for Economic and Financial Research (CEFIR), revised Jun 2006.
  2. Bach, Stefan & Corneo, Giacomo & Steiner, Viktor, 2012. "Optimal top marginal tax rates under income splitting for couples," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 56(6), pages 1055-1069.
  3. Bach, Stefan & Corneo, Giacomo & Steiner, Viktor, 2007. "From Bottom to Top: The Entire Distribution of Market Income in Germany, 1992-2001," CEPR Discussion Papers 6251, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  4. Jill McCluskey & Johan F.M. Swinnen, 2007. "Rational Ignorance and Negative News in the Information Market," LICOS Discussion Papers 19107, LICOS - Centre for Institutions and Economic Performance, KU Leuven.
  5. Rodrigo Taborda, 2011. "Media bias and central bank response. Evidence from the nominal exchange rate behavior in Colombia," DOCUMENTOS DE TRABAJO 009153, UNIVERSIDAD DEL ROSARIO.
  6. Florian Schuett & Amedeo Piolatto, 2014. "Media competition and electoral politics," Working Papers. Serie AD 2014-03, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie).
  7. Jenderny, Katharina, 2013. "Mobility of top incomes in Germany," Discussion Papers 2013/7, Free University Berlin, School of Business & Economics.
  8. Neher, Frank, 2011. "Markets wanted: Expectation overshooting in transition," Discussion Papers 2011/1, Free University Berlin, School of Business & Economics.
  9. Piolatto, A. & Schuett, F., 2013. "Media Competition and Electoral Politics," Discussion Paper 2013-072, .
  10. Jiancai Pi, 2010. "Media Capture and Local Government Accountability," Prague Economic Papers, University of Economics, Prague, vol. 2010(3), pages 273-283.
  11. Prat, Andrea & Strömberg, David, 2011. "The Political Economy of Mass Media," CEPR Discussion Papers 8246, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  12. Petrova, Maria, 2008. "Inequality and media capture," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 92(1-2), pages 183-212, February.
  13. Ascensión Andina-Díaz, 2007. "Reinforcement vs. change: The political influence of the media," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 131(1), pages 65-81, April.
  14. Serena Marianna Drufuca, 2014. "Information, Media and Elections: Incentives for Media Capture," Working Papers (2013-) 1402, University of Bergamo, Department of Management, Economics and Quantitative Methods.
  15. Maria Rosa Battaggion & Alessandro Vaglio, 2007. "The Demand for and the Supply of Pluralism: a Model of Media Market," Working Papers (-2012) 0708, University of Bergamo, Department of Economics.

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