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Media bias and electoral competition

  • Ascensión Andina Díaz

    (Universidad de Málaga)

We present a model of electoral competition with uninformed voters. There is a market for news with ideological media outlets. We consider two market structures: monopoly and duopoly. We show that if each party has the support of an outlet, either party has the same probability of winning the election. However, if just one of the parties has the support of the media, the results might well change as this party will get into o􀀡ce with a higher probability than the other party. We also analyze voters’ welfare and show that the important aspect is whether a media industry exists, and not the number of media outlets.

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Article provided by Fundación SEPI in its journal Investigaciones Económicas.

Volume (Year): 33 (2009)
Issue (Month): 2 (May)
Pages: 211-231

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Handle: RePEc:iec:inveco:v:33:y:2009:i:2:p:211-231
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  1. Timothy Besley & Andrea Prat, 2006. "Handcuffs for the Grabbing Hand? Media Capture and Government Accountability," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 96(3), pages 720-736, June.
  2. Vaidya, Samarth, 2005. "Corruption in the media's gaze," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 21(3), pages 667-687, September.
  3. Timothy Besley & Robin Burgess, 2000. "The Political Economy of Government Responsiveness: Theory and Evidence from India," STICERD - Development Economics Papers - From 2008 this series has been superseded by Economic Organisation and Public Policy Discussion Papers 28, Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines, LSE.
  4. John Ferejohn, 1986. "Incumbent performance and electoral control," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 50(1), pages 5-25, January.
  5. Giacomo Corneo, 2005. "Media Capture in a Democracy: The Role of Wealth Concentration," CESifo Working Paper Series 1402, CESifo Group Munich.
  6. Robert Barro, 1973. "The control of politicians: An economic model," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 14(1), pages 19-42, March.
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