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Recursive Lexicographical Search: Finding all Markov Perfect Equilibria of Finite State Directional Dynamic Games

Author

Listed:
  • Fedor Iskhakov

    (University New South Wales)

  • John Rust

    (Georgetown University)

  • Bertel Schjerning

    (Department of Economics, Copenhagen University)

Abstract

We define a class of dynamic Markovian games that we call directional dynamic games (DDG) in which directionality is represented by a partial order on the state space. We propose a fast and robust state recursion algorithm that can find a Markov perfect equilibrium (MPE) via backward induction on the state space of the game. When there are multiple equilibria, this algorithm relies on an equilibrium selection rule (ESR) to pick a particular MPE.We propose a recursive lexicographic search (RLS) algorithm that systematically and efficiently cycles through all feasible ESRs and prove that the RLS algorithm finds all MPE of the overall game. We apply the algorithms to find all MPE of a dynamic duopoly model of Bertrand price competition and cost reducing investments which we show is a DDG. Even with coarse discretization of the state space we find hundreds of millions of MPE in this game.

Suggested Citation

  • Fedor Iskhakov & John Rust & Bertel Schjerning, 2014. "Recursive Lexicographical Search: Finding all Markov Perfect Equilibria of Finite State Directional Dynamic Games," Discussion Papers 14-16, University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics.
  • Handle: RePEc:kud:kuiedp:1416
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Rust, John, 1987. "Optimal Replacement of GMC Bus Engines: An Empirical Model of Harold Zurcher," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 55(5), pages 999-1033, September.
    2. Kenneth L. Judd & Philipp Renner & Karl Schmedders, 2012. "Finding all pure‐strategy equilibria in games with continuous strategies," Quantitative Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 3(2), pages 289-331, July.
    3. Ariel Pakes & Paul McGuire, 1994. "Computing Markov-Perfect Nash Equilibria: Numerical Implications of a Dynamic Differentiated Product Model," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 25(4), pages 555-589, Winter.
    4. , & ,, 2010. "A theory of regular Markov perfect equilibria in dynamic stochastic games: genericity, stability, and purification," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 5(3), September.
    5. Pakes, Ariel & McGuire, Paul, 2001. "Stochastic Algorithms, Symmetric Markov Perfect Equilibrium, and the 'Curse' of Dimensionality," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 69(5), pages 1261-1281, September.
    6. Maskin, Eric & Tirole, Jean, 1988. "A Theory of Dynamic Oligopoly, I: Overview and Quantity Competition with Large Fixed Costs," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 56(3), pages 549-569, May.
    7. Richard Bellman, 1957. "On a Dynamic Programming Approach to the Caterer Problem--I," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 3(3), pages 270-278, April.
    8. Ritzberger, Klaus, 2002. "Foundations of Non-Cooperative Game Theory," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780199247868.
    9. Fedor Iskhakov & John Rust & Bertel Schjerning, 2018. "The Dynamics Of Bertrand Price Competition With Cost‐Reducing Investments," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 59(4), pages 1681-1731, November.
    10. Ruchira Datta, 2010. "Finding all Nash equilibria of a finite game using polynomial algebra," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 42(1), pages 55-96, January.
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    Cited by:

    1. Simon Quinn & Tom Gole, 2014. "Committees and Status Quo Bias: Structural Evidence from a Randomized Field Experiment," Economics Series Working Papers 733, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
    2. Jaap H. Abbring & Jeffrey R. Campbell & Jan Tilly & Nan Yang, 2018. "Very Simple Markov‐Perfect Industry Dynamics: Theory," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 86(2), pages 721-735, March.
    3. Jens Prüfer & Christoph Schottmüller, 2021. "Competing with Big Data," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 69(4), pages 967-1008, December.
    4. John Rust, 2014. "The Limits of Inference with Theory: A Review of Wolpin (2013)," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 52(3), pages 820-850, September.
    5. Doraszelski, Ulrich & Escobar, Juan F., 2019. "Protocol invariance and the timing of decisions in dynamic games," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 14(2), May.
    6. Andrew Sweeting & Dun Jia & Shen Hui & Xinlu Yao, 2022. "Dynamic Price Competition, Learning-by-Doing, and Strategic Buyers," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 112(4), pages 1311-1333, April.
    7. Axel Anderson & Jeremy Rosen & John Rust & Kin-Ping Wong, 2021. "Disequilibrium Play in Tennis," Working Papers gueconwpa~21-21-07, Georgetown University, Department of Economics.
    8. José‐Antonio Espín‐Sánchez & Álvaro Parra & Yuzhou Wang, 2023. "Equilibrium uniqueness in entry games with private information," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 54(3), pages 512-540, September.
    9. Kenneth Gillingham & Fedor Iskhakov & Anders Munk-Nielsen & John P. Rust & Bertel Schjerning, 2019. "Equilibrium Trade in Automobile Markets," NBER Working Papers 25840, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Dynamic games; directional dynamic games; Markov-perfect equilibrium; subgame perfect equilibrium; multiple equilibria; partial orders; directed acyclic graphs; d-subgames; generalized stage games; state recursion; recursive lexicographic search algorithm; variable-base arithmetic; successor function;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D92 - Microeconomics - - Micro-Based Behavioral Economics - - - Intertemporal Firm Choice, Investment, Capacity, and Financing
    • L11 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Production, Pricing, and Market Structure; Size Distribution of Firms
    • L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets

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