Recursive Lexicographical Search: Finding All Markov Perfect Equilibria of Finite State Directional Dynamic Games
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- Fedor Iskhakov & John Rust & Bertel Schjerning, 2014. "Recursive Lexicographical Search: Finding all Markov Perfect Equilibria of Finite State Directional Dynamic Games," Discussion Papers 14-16, University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics.
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Cited by:
- Simon Quinn & Tom Gole, 2014. "Committees and Status Quo Bias: Structural Evidence from a Randomized Field Experiment," Economics Series Working Papers 733, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
- Jaap H. Abbring & Jeffrey R. Campbell & Jan Tilly & Nan Yang, 2018.
"Very Simple Markov‐Perfect Industry Dynamics: Theory,"
Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 86(2), pages 721-735, March.
- Abbring, Jaap & Campbell, J.R. & Tilly, J. & Yang, N., 2017. "Very Simple Markov-Perfect Industry Dynamics : Theory," Discussion Paper 2017-020, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
- Abbring, Jaap & Campbell, J.R. & Tilly, J. & Yang, N., 2017. "Very Simple Markov-Perfect Industry Dynamics : Theory," Other publications TiSEM 742a0d4c-3766-45de-af30-4, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
- Jens Prüfer & Christoph Schottmüller, 2021.
"Competing with Big Data,"
Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 69(4), pages 967-1008, December.
- Prüfer, Jens & Schottmuller, C., 2017. "Competing with Big Data," Discussion Paper 2017-006, Tilburg University, Tilburg Law and Economic Center.
- Prüfer, Jens & Schottmuller, C., 2017. "Competing with Big Data," Other publications TiSEM b09cad5c-e6eb-4fe7-9184-f, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
- Prüfer, Jens & Schottmuller, C., 2017. "Competing with Big Data," Discussion Paper 2017-007, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
- Prüfer, Jens & Schottmuller, C., 2017. "Competing with Big Data," Other publications TiSEM 29de4480-00db-473b-a0ee-b, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
- John Rust, 2014. "The Limits of Inference with Theory: A Review of Wolpin (2013)," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 52(3), pages 820-850, September.
- Andrew Sweeting & Dun Jia & Shen Hui & Xinlu Yao, 2022.
"Dynamic Price Competition, Learning-by-Doing, and Strategic Buyers,"
American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 112(4), pages 1311-1333, April.
- Andrew Sweeting & Dun Jia & Shen Hui & Xinlu Yao, 2020. "Dynamic Price Competition, Learning-By-Doing and Strategic Buyers," NBER Working Papers 28272, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Axel Anderson & Jeremy Rosen & John Rust & Kin-Ping Wong, 2021.
"Disequilibrium Play in Tennis,"
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gueconwpa~21-21-07, Georgetown University, Department of Economics.
- Axel Anderson & Jeremy Rosen & John Rust & Kin-ping Wong, 2023. "Disequilibrium Play in Tennis," Working Papers gueconwpa~23-23-03, Georgetown University, Department of Economics.
- Jason R. Blevins, 2025. "Identification and Estimation of Continuous-Time Dynamic Discrete Choice Games," Papers 2511.02701, arXiv.org.
- Kenneth Gillingham & Fedor Iskhakov & Anders Munk-Nielsen & John Rust & Bertel Schjerning, 2019.
"Equilibrium trade in automobile markets,"
CESifo Working Paper Series
7650, CESifo.
- Kenneth Gillingham & Fedor Iskhakov & Anders Munk-Nielsen & John P. Rust & Bertel Schjerning, 2019. "Equilibrium Trade in Automobile Markets," NBER Working Papers 25840, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Doraszelski, Ulrich & Escobar, Juan F., 2019.
"Protocol invariance and the timing of decisions in dynamic games,"
Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 14(2), May.
- Doraszelski, Ulrich & Escobar, Juan, 2016. "Protocol Invariance and the Timing of Decisions in Dynamic Games," CEPR Discussion Papers 11447, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- José‐Antonio Espín‐Sánchez & Álvaro Parra & Yuzhou Wang, 2023.
"Equilibrium uniqueness in entry games with private information,"
RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 54(3), pages 512-540, September.
- Jos'-Antonio Esp'n-S'nchez & 'lvaro Parra & Yuzhou Wang, 2018. "Equilibrium Uniqueness in Entry Games with Private Information," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 2126R, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University, revised May 2021.
More about this item
JEL classification:
- D92 - Microeconomics - - Micro-Based Behavioral Economics - - - Intertemporal Firm Choice, Investment, Capacity, and Financing
- L11 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Production, Pricing, and Market Structure; Size Distribution of Firms
- L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
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