Risk-Taking Tournaments: Theory and Experimental Evidence
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- Nieken, Petra & Sliwka, Dirk, 2010. "Risk-taking tournaments - Theory and experimental evidence," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 31(3), pages 254-268, June.
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Citations
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Cited by:
- Eriksen, Kristoffer W. & Kvaløy, Ola, 2014.
"Myopic risk-taking in tournaments,"
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization,
Elsevier, vol. 97(C), pages 37-46.
- Eriksen, Kristoffer & Kvaløy, Ola, 2012. "Myopic Risk Taking in Tournaments," UiS Working Papers in Economics and Finance 2012/13, University of Stavanger.
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"Resource allocation contests: Experimental evidence,"
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Elsevier, vol. 39(C), pages 257-267.
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- Shupp, Robert & Sheremeta, Roman, 2013. "Resource Allocation Contests: Experimental Evidence," MPRA Paper 49889, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Robert Shupp & Roman M. Sheremeta & David Schmidt & James Walker, 2013. "Resource Allocation Contests: Experimental Evidence," Working Papers 13-23, Chapman University, Economic Science Institute.
- David Schmidt & Robert Shupp & James M. Walker, 2005. "Resource Allocation Contests: Experimental Evidence," Caepr Working Papers 2006-004, Center for Applied Economics and Policy Research, Economics Department, Indiana University Bloomington, revised Aug 2006.
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- Oliver Braganza, 2018. "Proxyeconomics, An agent based model of Campbell's law in competitive societal systems," Papers 1803.00345, arXiv.org.
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"Grind or Gamble? An Experimental Analysis of Effort and Spread Seeking in Contests,"
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- Philip Brookins & Jennifer Brown & Dmitry Ryvkin, 2016. "Peer Information and Risk-taking under Competitive and Non-competitive Pay Schemes," NBER Working Papers 22486, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
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"Interim Rank, Risk Taking, and Performance in Dynamic Tournaments,"
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- Genakos, Christos & Pagliero, Mario, 2009. "Risk taking and performance in multistage tournaments: evidence from weightlifting competitions," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 28599, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
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- Fang, Dawei & Holmén, Martin & Kleinlercher, Daniel & Kirchler, Michael, 2017. "How tournament incentives affect asset markets: A comparison between winner-take-all tournaments and elimination contests," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 75(C), pages 1-27.
More about this item
Keywords
risk-taking; competition; tournaments; experiment;JEL classification:
- M51 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Personnel Economics - - - Firm Employment Decisions; Promotions
- C91 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Individual Behavior
- D23 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-ALL-2008-03-25 (All new papers)
- NEP-CBE-2008-03-25 (Cognitive & Behavioural Economics)
- NEP-EXP-2008-03-25 (Experimental Economics)
- NEP-UPT-2008-03-25 (Utility Models & Prospect Theory)
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