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When Does Regulation Bite? Co-Determination and the Nature of Employment Relations

  • Uschi Backes-Gellner

    ()

    (Department of Business Administration, University of Zurich)

  • Jens Mohrenweiser

    ()

    (Centre for European Economic Research)

  • Kerstin Pull

    ()

    (Department of Human Resource Management and Organization, Eberhard Karls Universitaet Tuebingen)

The German Codetermination Law grants workers of establishments with 200 or more employees the right to have a works councillor fully exempted from his regular job while still being paid his regular salary. We analyze theoretically and empirically how this de jure right to paid leave of absence translates into practice and explicitly take into account the nature of the industrial relations participation regime. We find the right of exemption to make no difference in cooperative employment relations, but to develop its bite in adversarial rela-tions, i.e. when – without legal enforcement – the legislator’s intent would not be realized.

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File URL: http://repec.business.uzh.ch/RePEc/iso/ISU_WPS/147_ISU_full.pdf
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Paper provided by University of Zurich, Institute for Strategy and Business Economics (ISU) in its series Working Papers with number 0147.

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Length: 22 pages
Date of creation: Jul 2011
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:iso:wpaper:0147
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  1. Addison, John T. & Schnabel, Claus & Wagner, Joachim, 2003. "The Course of Research into the Economic Consequences of German Works Councils," IZA Discussion Papers 878, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
  2. Boris Hirsch & Thorsten Schank & Claus Schnabel, 2009. "Works Councils and Separations: Voice, Monopoly, and Insurance Effects," Working Papers 075, Bavarian Graduate Program in Economics (BGPE).
  3. Jens Mohrenweiser & Paul Marginson & Uschi Backes-Gellner, 2009. "What Triggers the Establishment of a Works Council?," Working Papers 0101, University of Zurich, Institute for Strategy and Business Economics (ISU), revised Jul 2010.
  4. Jens Mohrenweiser & Uschi Backes-Gellner, 2010. "Die Wirkung des Betriebsverfassungsgesetzes am Beispiel der Freistellung von Betriebsräten - ein Beitrag zur Rechtstatsachenforschung," Journal of Economics and Statistics (Jahrbuecher fuer Nationaloekonomie und Statistik), Justus-Liebig University Giessen, Department of Statistics and Economics, vol. 230(4), pages 420-435, August.
  5. Olaf H¸bler & Uwe Jirjahn, 2003. "Works Councils and Collective Bargaining in Germany: The Impact on Productivity and Wages," Scottish Journal of Political Economy, Scottish Economic Society, vol. 50(4), pages 471-491, 09.
  6. Uwe Jirjahn, 2009. "The Introduction of Works Councils in German Establishments - Rent Seeking or Rent Protection?," British Journal of Industrial Relations, London School of Economics, vol. 47(3), pages 521-545, 09.
  7. Joel Rogers & Wolfgang Streeck, 1995. "Works Councils: Consultation, Representation, and Cooperation in Industrial Relations," NBER Books, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc, number roge95-1.
  8. Steffen Mueller, 2009. "Are the firm owners really worse off with a works council?," Working Papers 081, Bavarian Graduate Program in Economics (BGPE).
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