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When Does Regulation Bite? Co-Determination and the Nature of Employment Relations

Author

Listed:
  • Uschi Backes-Gellner

    () (Department of Business Administration, University of Zurich)

  • Jens Mohrenweiser

    () (Centre for European Economic Research)

  • Kerstin Pull

    () (Department of Human Resource Management and Organization, Eberhard Karls Universitaet Tuebingen)

Abstract

The German Codetermination Law grants workers of establishments with 200 or more employees the right to have a works councillor fully exempted from his regular job while still being paid his regular salary. We analyze theoretically and empirically how this de jure right to paid leave of absence translates into practice and explicitly take into account the nature of the industrial relations participation regime. We find the right of exemption to make no difference in cooperative employment relations, but to develop its bite in adversarial rela-tions, i.e. when – without legal enforcement – the legislator’s intent would not be realized.

Suggested Citation

  • Uschi Backes-Gellner & Jens Mohrenweiser & Kerstin Pull, 2011. "When Does Regulation Bite? Co-Determination and the Nature of Employment Relations," Working Papers 0147, University of Zurich, Institute for Strategy and Business Economics (ISU).
  • Handle: RePEc:iso:wpaper:0147
    as

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    File URL: http://repec.business.uzh.ch/RePEc/iso/ISU_WPS/147_ISU_full.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Hirsch, Boris & Schank, Thorsten & Schnabel, Claus, 2009. "Work councils and separations: voice, monopoly, and insurance effects," Discussion Papers 62, Friedrich-Alexander University Erlangen-Nuremberg, Chair of Labour and Regional Economics.
    2. John T. Addison & Claus Schnabel & Joachim Wagner, 2004. "The Course of Research into the Economic Consequences of German Works Councils," British Journal of Industrial Relations, London School of Economics, vol. 42(2), pages 255-281, June.
    3. Jens Mohrenweiser & Paul Marginson & Uschi Backes-Gellner, 2009. "What Triggers the Establishment of a Works Council?," Working Papers 0101, University of Zurich, Institute for Strategy and Business Economics (ISU), revised Jul 2010.
    4. Steffen Mueller, 2009. "Are the firm owners really worse off with a works council?," Working Papers 081, Bavarian Graduate Program in Economics (BGPE).
    5. Olaf H¸bler & Uwe Jirjahn, 2003. "Works Councils and Collective Bargaining in Germany: The Impact on Productivity and Wages," Scottish Journal of Political Economy, Scottish Economic Society, vol. 50(4), pages 471-491, September.
    6. Uwe Jirjahn, 2009. "The Introduction of Works Councils in German Establishments - Rent Seeking or Rent Protection?," British Journal of Industrial Relations, London School of Economics, vol. 47(3), pages 521-545, September.
    7. Jens Mohrenweiser & Uschi Backes-Gellner, 2009. "Die Wirkung des Betriebsverfassungsgesetzes am Beispiel der Freistellung von Betriebsräten – ein Beitrag zur Rechtstatsachenforschung," Working Papers 0104, University of Zurich, Institute for Strategy and Business Economics (ISU).
    8. Joel Rogers & Wolfgang Streeck, 1995. "Works Councils: Consultation, Representation, and Cooperation in Industrial Relations," NBER Books, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc, number roge95-1, January.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    Cited by:

    1. Jirjahn, Uwe & Mohrenweiser, Jens, 2013. "Active owners and the failure of newly adopted works councils," ZEW Discussion Papers 13-080, ZEW - Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung / Center for European Economic Research.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Works councils; employment relations; de facto and de jure consequences of legal regulations;

    JEL classification:

    • J53 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Labor-Management Relations, Trade Unions, and Collective Bargaining - - - Labor-Management Relations; Industrial Jurisprudence
    • M54 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Personnel Economics - - - Labor Management
    • K31 - Law and Economics - - Other Substantive Areas of Law - - - Labor Law

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