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Planes Mínimos Obligatorios en Mercados de Seguros de Salud Segmentados

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Abstract

El objetivo de este trabajo es analizar los posibles determinantes a nivel individual del uso del seguro contra pérdida de ingreso por enfermedades comunes -no profesionales- o sistema de “licencias médicas”, como es comúnmente conocido en Chile. Para ello se trabaja con una encuesta ad-hoc realizada a beneficiarios cotizantes del sistema en la ciudad de Santiago. Los resultados obtenidos son consistentes con la literatura internacional y la teoría económica. Ellos permiten identificar variables que afectan el uso del seguro que serían indicativas de un uso ilegal del mismo, otras que son indicativas de problemas de cobertura del seguro y otras que directamente desnudan un diseño ineficiente del seguro para controlar problemas de riesgo moral. Los hallazgos de la investigación se traducen en propuestas para reformar este seguro haciendo compatibles consideraciones de eficiencia y equidad.

Suggested Citation

  • Edmundo Beteta & Manuel Willington, 2010. "Planes Mínimos Obligatorios en Mercados de Seguros de Salud Segmentados," ILADES-UAH Working Papers inv251, Universidad Alberto Hurtado/School of Economics and Business.
    • Handle: RePEc:ila:ilades:inv251
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    1. Nicolas R. Ziebarth & Martin Karlsson, 2014. "The Effects Of Expanding The Generosity Of The Statutory Sickness Insurance System," Journal of Applied Econometrics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 29(2), pages 208-230, March.
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    4. Maria De Paola & Valeria Pupo & Vincenzo Scoppa, 2009. "Absenteeism In The Italian Public Sector: The Effects Of Changes In Sick Leave Compensation," Working Papers 200916, Università della Calabria, Dipartimento di Economia, Statistica e Finanza "Giovanni Anania" - DESF.
    5. Georges Dionne & Benoit Dostie, 2007. "New Evidence on the Determinants of Absenteeism Using Linked Employer-Employee Data," ILR Review, Cornell University, ILR School, vol. 61(1), pages 108-120, October.
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    Cited by:

    1. Willington Manuel & Alegría Alexander, 2012. "Collusion in a One-Period Insurance Market with Adverse Selection," The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 12(1), pages 1-32, April.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Ausentismo Laboral; Riesgo Moral; Seguros por enfermedades comunes.;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • J41 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Particular Labor Markets - - - Labor Contracts
    • J45 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Particular Labor Markets - - - Public Sector Labor Markets
    • M52 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Personnel Economics - - - Compensation and Compensation Methods and Their Effects
    • D86 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Economics of Contract Law
    • C20 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Single Equation Models; Single Variables - - - General

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