Sorting Out Mechanical and Psychological Effects in Candidate Elections: An Appraisal with Experimental Data
The paper proposes a way to measure mechanical and psychological effects of majority runoff versus plurality electoral systems in candidate elections. Building on a series of laboratory experiments, we evaluate these effects with respect to the probability of electing a Condorcet winner candidate. In our experiment, the runoff system very slightly favours the Condorcet winner candidate, but this total effect is small. We show that this is the case because the mechanical and psychological effects tend to cancel each other out. Compared to plurality, the mechanical effect of runoffs is to systematically advantage the Condorcet winner candidate, as usually assumed; but our study detects an opposite psychological effect, to the disadvantage of this candidate.
|Date of creation:||Apr 2012|
|Date of revision:|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: Manufacture des Tabacs, Aile Jean-Jacques Laffont, 21 Allée de Brienne, 31000 TOULOUSE|
Phone: +33 (0)5 61 12 85 89
Fax: + 33 (0)5 61 12 86 37
Web page: http://www.idei.fr/
More information through EDIRC
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Blais, André & Laslier, Jean-François & Sauger, Nicolas & Van Der Straeten, Karine, 2009.
"Strategic, Sincere and Heuristic Voting under Four Election Rules: An Experimental Study,"
TSE Working Papers
09-065, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE).
- Karine Van der Straeten & Jean-François Laslier & Nicolas Sauger & André Blais, 2010. "Strategic, sincere, and heuristic voting under four election rules: an experimental study," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 35(3), pages 435-472, September.
- Blais, André & Laslier, Jean-François & Sauger, Nicolas & Van Der Straeten, Karine, 2009. "Strategic, Sincere and Heuristic Voting under Four Election Rules: An Experimental Study," IDEI Working Papers 559, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ide:wpaper:25770. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: ()
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.