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Democratic values transmission


  • Pablo Branas-Garza

    (Business School, Middlesex University London)

  • Maria Paz Espinosa

    (Departamento de Fundamentos Analisis Economico II,University of the Basque Country
    BRiDGE,University of the Basque Country)

  • Ayca Ebru Giritligil

    (BELIS, Istanbul Bilgi University)


This study addresses the issue of intergenerational transmission of democratic values embedded in social choice rules. We focus on a few rules which have been the focus of social choice theory: plurality, plural- ity with a runoff, majoritarian compromise, social compromise and Borda rule. We confront subjects with preferences profiles of a hypothetical electorate over a set of four alternatives. Different rules produce different outcomes and subjects decide which alternative should be chosen for the society whose preference profile is shown. We elicit each subject’s pref- erences over rules and his/her parents’ and check whether there is any relationship; 186 students and their parents attended the sessions at Is- tanbul Bilgi University. Overall, we find support for the hypothesis of parental transmission of democratic values and gender differences in the transmitted rule.

Suggested Citation

  • Pablo Branas-Garza & Maria Paz Espinosa & Ayca Ebru Giritligil, 2014. "Democratic values transmission," SEET Working Papers 2014-01, BELIS, Istanbul Bilgi University.
  • Handle: RePEc:beb:wpseet:201401

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    References listed on IDEAS

    1. repec:cup:apsrev:v:68:y:1974:i:04:p:1579-1592_10 is not listed on IDEAS
    2. Murat R. Sertel & Ayca E.G. Kara, 2000. "Selecting A Social Choice Rule: An Exploratory Panel Study," Working Papers 2029, Economic Research Forum, revised 10 May 2000.
    3. Matías Núñez & Jean Laslier, 2014. "Preference intensity representation: strategic overstating in large elections," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 42(2), pages 313-340, February.
    4. Ayça Giritligil Kara & Murat Sertel, 2005. "Does majoritarian approval matter in selecting a social choice rule? An exploratory panel study," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 25(1), pages 43-73, October.
    5. Smith, John H, 1973. "Aggregation of Preferences with Variable Electorate," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 41(6), pages 1027-1041, November.
    6. Pablo Brañas-Garza & Shoshana Neuman, 2007. "Parental religiosity and daughters’ fertility: the case of Catholics in southern Europe," Review of Economics of the Household, Springer, vol. 5(3), pages 305-327, September.
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    8. repec:cup:apsrev:v:62:y:1968:i:01:p:169-184_11 is not listed on IDEAS
    9. Karine Van der Straeten & Jean-François Laslier & Nicolas Sauger & André Blais, 2010. "Strategic, sincere, and heuristic voting under four election rules: an experimental study," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 35(3), pages 435-472, September.
    10. Pablo Brañas-Garza & Shoshana Neuman, 2006. "Intergenerational Transmission of 'Religious Capital': Evidence from Spain," Papers on Economics of Religion 06/02, Department of Economic Theory and Economic History of the University of Granada..
    11. Alberto Bisin & Thierry Verdier, 2010. "The Economics of Cultural Transmission and Socialization," NBER Working Papers 16512, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • C90 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - General

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