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Choosing an Electoral Rule

Author

Listed:
  • Bol, Damien

    (Université de Montréal)

  • Blais, André
  • Coulombe, Maxime
  • Laslier, Jean-François
  • Pilet, Jean-Benoit

Abstract

Citizens are increasingly involved in the design of democratic institutions, for instance via referendums. If they support the institution that best serves their self-interest, the outcome inevitably advantages the largest group and disadvantages minorities. In this paper, we challenge this pessimistic view with an original lab experiment in France and Great Britain. In the first phase, experimental subjects experience elections under plurality and approval voting. In the second phase, they decide which rule they want to use for extra elections. The treatment is whether they do or do not have information to determine where their self-interest lies before deciding. We find that self-interest shapes people’s decisions, but so do intrinsic egalitarian values that subjects have outside of the lab. The implications are: (1) people have consistent ‘value-driven preferences’ for electoral rules, and (2) putting them in a situation of uncertainty leads to an outcome that reflects these values.

Suggested Citation

  • Bol, Damien & Blais, André & Coulombe, Maxime & Laslier, Jean-François & Pilet, Jean-Benoit, 2020. "Choosing an Electoral Rule," SocArXiv rm2tq, Center for Open Science.
  • Handle: RePEc:osf:socarx:rm2tq
    DOI: 10.31219/osf.io/rm2tq
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. André Blais & Jean-François Laslier & François Poinas & Karine Straeten, 2015. "Citizens’ preferences about voting rules: self-interest, ideology, and sincerity," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 164(3), pages 423-442, September.
    2. Carles Boix, 1999. "Setting the rules of the game: The choice of electoral systems in advanced democracies," Economics Working Papers 367, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra.
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    4. Chang, Eric C. C. & Golden, Miriam A., 2007. "Electoral Systems, District Magnitude and Corruption," British Journal of Political Science, Cambridge University Press, vol. 37(1), pages 115-137, January.
    5. Antoinette Baujard & Herrade Igersheim & Isabelle Lebon & Frédéric Gavrel & Jean-François Laslier, 2014. "Who's favored by evaluative voting? An experiment conducted during the 2012 French presidential election," PSE-Ecole d'économie de Paris (Postprint) halshs-01113068, HAL.
    6. Matthias Sutter & Stefan Haigner & Martin G. Kocher, 2010. "Choosing the Carrot or the Stick? Endogenous Institutional Choice in Social Dilemma Situations," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 77(4), pages 1540-1566.
    7. Guillem Riambau & Steven Stillman & Geua Boe-Gibson, 2021. "What determines preferences for an electoral system? Evidence from a binding referendum," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 186(1), pages 179-208, January.
    8. Karine Van der Straeten & Jean-François Laslier & Nicolas Sauger & André Blais, 2010. "Strategic, sincere, and heuristic voting under four election rules: an experimental study," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 35(3), pages 435-472, September.
    9. repec:hal:pseose:halshs-01310218 is not listed on IDEAS
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    Cited by:

    1. Durand, François & Macé, Antonin & Núñez, Matías, 2024. "Voter coordination in elections: A case for approval voting," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 146(C), pages 1-34.
    2. Timo Hoffmann & Sander Renes, 2022. "Flip a coin or vote? An experiment on the implementation and efficiency of social choice mechanisms," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 25(2), pages 624-655, April.

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