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Effects of Dismissal Protection Legislation on Individual Employment Stability in Germany

Changes in Dismissal Protection Legislation in Germany have been a subject to ongoing research in the past decade. The majority of these studies, however, has not been able to determine significant effects on job and worker flows in firms affected by the reforms. We estimate the impact of dismissal protection on individual employment stability using the 1999 reform as a "natural experiment".We provide insights into the effects of legislation on the firms’ matching behaviour. Our results hint at increased job security after the reform for those spells affected by it. This rise in stability was, however, accompanied by modest instability at start suggesting that firms facing additional firing costs tend to cease probation to shed unproductive job-worker matches. The latter effect, however, was not found to be significant.

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File URL: http://www.iaw.edu/RePEc/iaw/pdf/iaw_dp_45.pdf
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Paper provided by Institut für Angewandte Wirtschaftsforschung (IAW) in its series IAW Discussion Papers with number 45.

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Length: 30 pages
Date of creation: Oct 2008
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:iaw:iawdip:45
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  1. Pietro Garibaldi & Lia Pacelli & Andrea Borgarello, 2004. "Employment Protection Legislation and the Size of Firms," Giornale degli Economisti, GDE (Giornale degli Economisti e Annali di Economia), Bocconi University, vol. 63(1), pages 33-68, April.
  2. Bertola, Giuseppe, 1990. "Job security, employment and wages," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 34(4), pages 851-879, June.
  3. Saint-Paul, Gilles, 1991. "Dynamic labor demand with dual labor markets," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 36(2), pages 219-222, June.
  4. Boockmann, Bernhard & Hagen, Tobias, 2008. "Fixed-term contracts as sorting mechanisms: Evidence from job durations in West Germany," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 15(5), pages 984-1005, October.
  5. Boeri, Tito, 1999. "Enforcement of employment security regulations, on-the-job search and unemployment duration," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 43(1), pages 65-89, January.
  6. Roberto Torrini & Fabiano Schivardi, 2004. "Threshold effects and firm size: The case of firing costs," 2004 Meeting Papers 445, Society for Economic Dynamics.
  7. John T. Addison & Paulino Teixeira, 2003. "The Economics of Employment Protection," Journal of Labor Research, Transaction Publishers, vol. 24(1), pages 85-129, January.
  8. Lazear, Edward P, 1990. "Job Security Provisions and Employment," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 105(3), pages 699-726, August.
  9. Alda, Holger & Bender, Stefan & Gartner, Hermann, 2005. "The linked employer-employee dataset of the IAB (LIAB)," IAB Discussion Paper 200506, Institut für Arbeitsmarkt- und Berufsforschung (IAB), Nürnberg [Institute for Employment Research, Nuremberg, Germany].
  10. Jahn, Elke J. & Schnabel, Claus, 2003. "Bestandsschutz durch Abfindungen: Höhere Rechtssicherheit und Effizienz," Wirtschaftsdienst – Zeitschrift für Wirtschaftspolitik (1998 - 2007), ZBW – German National Library of Economics / Leibniz Information Centre for Economics, vol. 83(4), pages 219-223.
  11. Verick, Sher, 2004. "Threshold Effects of Dismissal Protection Legislation in Germany," IZA Discussion Papers 991, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
  12. Ashenfelter, Orley C, 1978. "Estimating the Effect of Training Programs on Earnings," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 60(1), pages 47-57, February.
  13. Pissarides, Christopher A., 2001. "Employment protection," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 8(2), pages 131-159, May.
  14. Boockmann, Bernhard & Steffes, Susanne, 2005. "Individual and Plant-level Determinants of Job Durations in Germany," ZEW Discussion Papers 05-89, ZEW - Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung / Center for European Economic Research.
  15. Koller, Lena, 2005. "Arbeitsrechtliche Schwellenwerte: Regelungen an der Schwelle zur Unüberschaubarkeit," Discussion Papers 40, Friedrich-Alexander-University Erlangen-Nuremberg, Chair of Labour and Regional Economics.
  16. Boockmann, Bernhard & Hagen, Tobias, 2001. "The use of flexible working contracts in West Germany: evidence from an establishment panel," ZEW Discussion Papers 01-33, ZEW - Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung / Center for European Economic Research.
  17. Alberto Abadie, 2005. "Semiparametric Difference-in-Differences Estimators," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 72(1), pages 1-19.
  18. Ammermüller, Andreas & Zwick, Thomas & Boockmann, Bernhard & Maier, Michael, 2007. "Do hiring subsidies reduce unemployment among the elderly? Evidence from two natural experiments," ZEW Discussion Papers 07-001, ZEW - Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung / Center for European Economic Research.
  19. Boockmann, Bernhard & Steffes, Susanne, 2007. "Seniority and Job Stability: A Quantile Regression Approach Using Matched Employer-Employee Data," ZEW Discussion Papers 07-014, ZEW - Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung / Center for European Economic Research.
  20. Boeri, Tito, 1996. "Is Job Turnover Countercyclical?," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 14(4), pages 603-25, October.
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