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Schwellenwerte im Arbeitsrecht: Höhere Transparenz und Effizienz durch Vereinheitlichung

  • Lena Koller
  • Claus Schnabel
  • Joachim Wagner

In Germany, many labour laws and regulations apply only in establishments above a critical size, and usually these thresholds are defined by the number of employees. The existing 160 thresholds are complex and defined inconsistently, making it difficult for firms to obey the law. Moreover, exceeding a threshold may result in costs for the firm such as establishing a works council or paying a penalty for not employing disabled persons. Although the empirical evidence is mixed, some studies suggest that employment growth is dampened by firms avoiding to exceed thresholds. In order to minimize these transaction costs and side effects, we make several suggestions to simplify and unify the threshold regulations.

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File URL: http://www.bgpe.de/texte/DP/015_koller.pdf
File Function: First version, 2007
Download Restriction: no

Paper provided by Bavarian Graduate Program in Economics (BGPE) in its series Working Papers with number 015.

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Length: 20 pages
Date of creation: Feb 2007
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:bav:wpaper:015_koller
Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.bgpe.de/
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  1. Verick, Sher, 2004. "Threshold Effects of Dismissal Protection Legislation in Germany," IZA Discussion Papers 991, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
  2. Garibaldi, Pietro, 2006. "Personnel Economics in Imperfect Labour Markets," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780199280674.
  3. Tito Boeri, 2004. "The Effects of Employment Protection: Learning from Variable Enforcement," 2004 Meeting Papers 445a, Society for Economic Dynamics.
  4. Bauer, Thomas K. & Bender, Stefan & Bonin, Holger, 2004. "Dismissal Protection and Worker Flows in Small Establishments," IZA Discussion Papers 1105, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
  5. Schivardi, Fabiano & Torrini, Roberto, 2005. "Identifying the Effects of Firing Restrictions Through Size-Contingent Differences in Regulation," CEPR Discussion Papers 5303, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  6. Boockmann, Bernhard & Hagen, Tobias, 2001. "The use of flexible working contracts in West Germany: evidence from an establishment panel," ZEW Discussion Papers 01-33, ZEW - Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung / Center for European Economic Research.
  7. Jahn, Elke J. & Schnabel, Claus, 2003. "Bestandsschutz durch Abfindungen: Höhere Rechtssicherheit und Effizienz," Wirtschaftsdienst – Zeitschrift für Wirtschaftspolitik (1998 - 2007), ZBW – German National Library of Economics / Leibniz Information Centre for Economics, vol. 83(4), pages 219-223.
  8. Derik Burgert, 2006. "The Impact of German Job Protection Legislation on Job Creation in Small Establishments," Applied Economics Quarterly (formerly: Konjunkturpolitik), Duncker & Humblot, Berlin, vol. 52(2), pages 123-139.
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