IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/
MyIDEAS: Login to save this paper

Congestion Management in Electricity Networks: Nodal, Zonal and Discriminatory Pricing

Wholesale electricity markets use different market designs to handle congestion in the transmission network. We compare nodal, zonal and discriminatory pricing in general networks with transmission constraints and loop flows. We conclude that in large games with many producers who are allowed to participate in the real-time market the three market designs result in the same efficient dispatch. However, zonal pricing with counter-trading results in additional payments to producers in export-constrained nodes.

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://www.ifn.se/wfiles/wp/wp915.pdf
Download Restriction: no

Paper provided by Research Institute of Industrial Economics in its series Working Paper Series with number 915.

as
in new window

Length: 32 pages
Date of creation: 20 Apr 2012
Date of revision:
Publication status: Published as Holmberg, Pär and Ewa Lazarczyk, 'Comparison of congestion management techniques: Nodal, zonal and discriminatory pricing.' in Energy Journal, 2015, pages 145-166.
Handle: RePEc:hhs:iuiwop:0915
Contact details of provider: Postal:
Research Institute of Industrial Economics, Box 55665, SE-102 15 Stockholm, Sweden

Phone: +46 8 665 4500
Fax: +46 8 665 4599
Web page: http://www.ifn.se/
Email:


More information through EDIRC

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

as in new window
  1. Bernard, Jean-Thomas & Guertin, Chantal, 2000. "Nodal Pricing and Transmissions Losses. An Application to a Hydroelectric Power System," Cahiers de recherche 0007, GREEN.
  2. Cho, In-Koo, 2003. " Competitive Equilibrium in a Radial Network," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 34(3), pages 438-60, Autumn.
  3. Holmberg, Pär & Newbery, David, 2010. "The supply function equilibrium and its policy implications for wholesale electricity auctions," Utilities Policy, Elsevier, vol. 18(4), pages 209-226, December.
  4. Edward J. Anderson & Pär Holmberg & Andrew B. Philpott, 2013. "Mixed strategies in discriminatory divisible-good auctions," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 44(1), pages 1-32, 03.
  5. Dijk, Justin & Willems, Bert, 2011. "The effect of counter-trading on competition in electricity markets," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 39(3), pages 1764-1773, March.
  6. Karsten Neuhoff & Rodney Boyd & Thilo Grau & Julian Barquin & Francisco Echavarren & Janusz Bialek & Chris Dent & Christian von Hirschhausen & Benjamin Hobbs & Friedrich Kunz & Hannes Weigt & Christia, 2011. "Renewable Electric Energy Integration: Quantifying the Value of Design of Markets for International Transmission Capacity," Discussion Papers of DIW Berlin 1166, DIW Berlin, German Institute for Economic Research.
  7. Berenstein, Severin & Bushnell, James & Stoft, Steven, 2000. "The Competitive Effects of Transmission Capacity in a Deregulated Electricity Industry," Staff General Research Papers 13145, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
  8. Brunekreeft, Gert & Neuhoff, Karsten & Newbery, David, 2005. "Electricity transmission: An overview of the current debate," Utilities Policy, Elsevier, vol. 13(2), pages 73-93, June.
  9. Green, Richard J & Joanne Evans, 2003. "Why did British electricity prices fall after 1998?," Royal Economic Society Annual Conference 2003 92, Royal Economic Society.
  10. Ehrenmann, Andreas & Smeers, Yves, 2005. "Inefficiencies in European congestion management proposals," Utilities Policy, Elsevier, vol. 13(2), pages 135-152, June.
  11. Richard Gilbert & Neuhoff, K. & Newbery, D., 2002. "Allocating Transmission to Mitigate Market Power in Electricity Networks," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 0225, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge.
  12. Leuthold, Florian & Weigt, Hannes & von Hirschhausen, Christian, 2008. "Efficient pricing for European electricity networks - The theory of nodal pricing applied to feeding-in wind in Germany," Utilities Policy, Elsevier, vol. 16(4), pages 284-291, December.
  13. Stoft, Steven, 1997. "Transmission pricing zones: simple or complex?," The Electricity Journal, Elsevier, vol. 10(1), pages 24-31.
  14. Green, Richard, 2010. "Are the British electricity trading and transmission arrangements future-proof?," Utilities Policy, Elsevier, vol. 18(4), pages 186-194, December.
  15. Hsu, Michael, 1997. "An introduction to the pricing of electric power transmission," Utilities Policy, Elsevier, vol. 6(3), pages 257-270, September.
  16. Chao, Hung-Po & Peck, Stephen, 1996. "A Market Mechanism for Electric Power Transmission," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 10(1), pages 25-59, July.
  17. Neuhoff, Karsten & Barquin, Julian & Boots, Maroeska G. & Ehrenmann, Andreas & Hobbs, Benjamin F. & Rijkers, Fieke A.M. & Vazquez, Miguel, 2005. "Network-constrained Cournot models of liberalized electricity markets: the devil is in the details," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 27(3), pages 495-525, May.
  18. Richard Green, 2007. "Nodal pricing of electricity: how much does it cost to get it wrong?," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 31(2), pages 125-149, April.
  19. Hogan, William W, 1992. "Contract Networks for Electric Power Transmission," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 4(3), pages 211-42, September.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:hhs:iuiwop:0915. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Elisabeth Gustafsson)

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis using RePEc data.