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Congestion management in electricity networks: Nodal, zonal and discriminatory pricing

Author

Listed:
  • Pär Holmberg

    (Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IFN) Stockholm, Sweden)

  • Ewa Lazarczyk

    (Stockholm School of Economics, Department of Economics, Stockholm, Sweden)

Abstract

Wholesale electricity markets use different market designs to handle congestion in the transmission network. We compare nodal, zonal and discriminatory pricing in general networks with transmission constraints and loop flows. We conclude that in large games with many producers who are allowed to participate in the real-time market the three market designs result in the same efficient dispatch. However, zonal pricing with counter-trading results in additional payments to producers in export-constrained nodes.
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)

Suggested Citation

  • Pär Holmberg & Ewa Lazarczyk, 2012. "Congestion management in electricity networks: Nodal, zonal and discriminatory pricing," Working Papers EPRG 1209, Energy Policy Research Group, Cambridge Judge Business School, University of Cambridge.
    • Handle: RePEc:enp:wpaper:eprg1209
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    Cited by:

    1. Grimm, Veronika & Martin, Alexander & Weibelzahl, Martin & Zöttl, Gregor, 2016. "On the long run effects of market splitting: Why more price zones might decrease welfare," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 94(C), pages 453-467.
    2. Osińska, Magdalena & Kyzym, Mykola & Khaustova, Victoriia & Ilyash, Olha & Salashenko, Tetiana, 2022. "Does the Ukrainian electricity market correspond to the european model?," Utilities Policy, Elsevier, vol. 79(C).
    3. Grimm, Veronika & Martin, Alexander & Weibelzahl, Martin & Zöttl, Gregor, 2014. "Transmission and Generation Investment in Electricity Markets: The Effects of Market Splitting and Network Fee Regimes," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 460, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
    4. Hesamzadeh, Mohammad Reza & Holmberg, Pär & Sarfati, Mahir, 2018. "Simulation and Evaluation of Zonal Electricity Market Designs," Working Paper Series 1211, Research Institute of Industrial Economics.
    5. Grimm, Veronika & Martin, Alexander & Weibenzahl, Martin & Zoettl, Gregor, 2014. "Transmission and generation investment in electricity markets: The effects of market splitting and network fee regimes," FAU Discussion Papers in Economics 04/2014, Friedrich-Alexander University Erlangen-Nuremberg, Institute for Economics.
    6. Chaves-Ávila, José Pablo & van der Veen, Reinier A.C. & Hakvoort, Rudi A., 2014. "The interplay between imbalance pricing mechanisms and network congestions – Analysis of the German electricity market," Utilities Policy, Elsevier, vol. 28(C), pages 52-61.
    7. Geoffrey Mabea, 2023. "Simulating Generalised Locational Marginal Pricing for Power Markets in East Africa," International Journal of Energy Economics and Policy, Econjournals, vol. 13(5), pages 450-460, September.
    8. Erik Heilmann & Nikolai Klempp & Kai Hufendiek & Heike Wetzel, 2022. "Long-term Contracts for Network-supportive Flexibility in Local Flexibility Markets," MAGKS Papers on Economics 202224, Philipps-Universität Marburg, Faculty of Business Administration and Economics, Department of Economics (Volkswirtschaftliche Abteilung).
    9. Karhinen, Santtu & Huuki, Hannu, 2020. "How are the long distances between renewable energy sources and load centres reflected in locational marginal prices?," Energy, Elsevier, vol. 210(C).
    10. Grimm, Veronika & Martin, Alexander & Schmidt, Martin & Weibelzahl, Martin & Zöttl, Gregor, 2016. "Transmission and generation investment in electricity markets: The effects of market splitting and network fee regimes," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 254(2), pages 493-509.
    11. Bjørndal, Endre & Bjørndal, Mette Helene & Coniglio, Stefano & Körner, Marc-Fabian & Leinauer, Christina & Weibelzahl, Martin, 2023. "Energy storage operation and electricity market design: On the market power of monopolistic storage operators," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 307(2), pages 887-909.
    12. Mirjam Ambrosius & Jonas Egerer & Veronika Grimm & Adriaan H van der Weijde, 2019. "The role of expectations for market design - on structural regulatory uncertainty in electricity markets," Working Papers EPRG1915, Energy Policy Research Group, Cambridge Judge Business School, University of Cambridge.
    13. Pär Holmberg & Andy Philpott, 2014. "Supply function equilibria in transportation networks," Working Papers EPRG 1401, Energy Policy Research Group, Cambridge Judge Business School, University of Cambridge.
    14. Jonas Egerer & Jens Weibezahn & Hauke Hermann, 2015. "Two Price Zones for the German Electricity Market: Market Implications and Distributional Effects," Discussion Papers of DIW Berlin 1451, DIW Berlin, German Institute for Economic Research.
    15. Krebs, Vanessa & Schewe, Lars & Schmidt, Martin, 2018. "Uniqueness and multiplicity of market equilibria on DC power flow networks," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 271(1), pages 165-178.

    More about this item

    Keywords

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    JEL classification:

    • J - Labor and Demographic Economics
    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Auctions
    • D61 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Allocative Efficiency; Cost-Benefit Analysis
    • L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
    • L94 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Transportation and Utilities - - - Electric Utilities

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