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« Can a Platform Make Profit with Consumers' Mobility? A Two-Sided Monopoly Model with Random Endogenous Side-Switching »

Author

Listed:
  • Pierre Andreoletti

    (MAPMO - Mathématiques - Analyse, Probabilités, Modélisation - Orléans - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - UO - Université d'Orléans)

  • Pierre Gazé

    (LEO - Laboratoire d'Économie d'Orleans - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - Université de Tours - UO - Université d'Orléans)

  • Maxime Menuet

    (LEO - Laboratoire d'Économie d'Orleans - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - Université de Tours - UO - Université d'Orléans)

Abstract

We model a specific two-sided monopoly market in which agents can switch from a side to the other. We define two periods of time. In the first period, agents buy the platform services on each side and in the second period of time, they can possibly enhance their satisfaction by going to the other face of the platform. We analyze the link between mobility, consumer's utility, prices and profit. We show that mobility is a valuable feature which can be compared with an increase of product quality. Finally, the firm is able to capture the mobility in its monopoly's profit. The relative size of each group then appears as a strategical variable for the firm.

Suggested Citation

  • Pierre Andreoletti & Pierre Gazé & Maxime Menuet, 2016. "« Can a Platform Make Profit with Consumers' Mobility? A Two-Sided Monopoly Model with Random Endogenous Side-Switching »," Working Papers halshs-01251365, HAL.
  • Handle: RePEc:hal:wpaper:halshs-01251365
    Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-01251365
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Amelio, Andrea & Jullien, Bruno, 2012. "Tying and freebies in two-sided markets," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 30(5), pages 436-446.
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    6. Chakravorti Sujit & Roson Roberto, 2006. "Platform Competition in Two-Sided Markets: The Case of Payment Networks," Review of Network Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 5(1), pages 1-25, March.
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    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    Keywords

    externalities; side-switching; two-sided markets;
    All these keywords.

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