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Joint innovation in ICT standards: How consortia drive the volume of patent filings

  • Justus Baron

    ()

    (CERNA i3 - Centre d'économie industrielle i3 - MINES ParisTech - École nationale supérieure des mines de Paris - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - PSL - PSL Research University)

  • Yann Ménière

    ()

    (CERNA i3 - Centre d'économie industrielle i3 - MINES ParisTech - École nationale supérieure des mines de Paris - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - PSL - PSL Research University)

  • Tim Pohlmann

    (TUB - Technische Universität Berlin [Berlin])

The development of formal ICT standards is a loose form of collaborative innovation: firms first develop rival technologies, some of which are then eventually selected in the standard. Against this background, firms often use informal consortia to define a clearer technology roadmap ahead of the formal standard setting process. The paper aims to assess how such consortia influence the volume of patents filed around standards, and whether this is efficient. We show that their effect actually depends on the strength of firms' incentives to develop the standard. Consortium membership triggers a higher number of patent files when insufficient rewards for essential patents induce underinvestment in the standard. This effect is necessarily pro-efficient. In situations where excessive rewards induce patent races, consortium membership only moderately increases or even reduces their volume of patents. At least in the latter case, the effect of consortia membership is also pro-efficient.

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Date of creation: 11 Jun 2012
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Handle: RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-00707291
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  1. Nick Bloom & Mark Schankerman & John Van Reenen, 2005. "Identifying technology spillovers and product market rivalry," Proceedings, Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco.
  2. Aija Elina Leiponen, 2008. "Competing Through Cooperation: The Organization of Standard Setting in Wireless Telecommunications," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 54(11), pages 1904-1919, November.
  3. Henry Delcamp & Aija Leiponen, 2012. "Innovating Standards through Informal Consortia: The Case of Wireless Telecommunications," NBER Chapters, in: Standards, Patents and Innovations National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  4. Richard Blundell & Rachel Griffith & Frank Windmeijer, 1999. "Individual effects and dynamics in count data models," IFS Working Papers W99/03, Institute for Fiscal Studies.
  5. Bernhard Ganglmair & Emanuele Tarantino, 2012. "Patent Disclosure in Standard Setting," NBER Chapters, in: Standards, Patents and Innovations National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  6. Chiao, Benjamin & Lerner, Josh & Tirole, Jean, 2007. "The Rules of Standard Setting Organizations: An Empirical Analysis," CEPR Discussion Papers 6141, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  7. Josh Lerner & Jean Tirole, 2006. "A Model of Forum Shopping," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 96(4), pages 1091-1113, September.
  8. Rysman, Marc & Simcoe, Tim, 2009. "Patents and the Performance of Voluntary Standard Setting Organizations," PIE/CIS Discussion Paper 418, Center for Intergenerational Studies, Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University.
  9. Layne-Farrar, Anne & Lerner, Josh, 2011. "To join or not to join: Examining patent pool participation and rent sharing rules," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 29(2), pages 294-303, March.
  10. Hawkins, Richard, 1999. "The rise of consortia in the information and communication technology industries: emerging implications for policy," Telecommunications Policy, Elsevier, vol. 23(2), pages 159-173, March.
  11. Lee G. Branstetter & Mariko Sakakibara, 2002. "When Do Research Consortia Work Well and Why? Evidence from Japanese Panel Data," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 92(1), pages 143-159, March.
  12. Grid Thoma & Salvatore Torrisi & Alfonso Gambardella & Dominique Guellec & Bronwyn H. Hall & Dietmar Harhoff, 2010. "Harmonizing and Combining Large Datasets - An Application to Firm-Level Patent and Accounting Data," NBER Working Papers 15851, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  13. Pohlmann, Tim, 2010. "Attributes and Dynamic Development Phases of Informal ICT Consortia," MPRA Paper 27341, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 01 Jun 2010.
  14. Timothy Simcoe, 2012. "Standard Setting Committees: Consensus Governance for Shared Technology Platforms," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 102(1), pages 305-36, February.
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