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Patent Disclosure in Standard Setting

We present a model of industry standard setting with two-sided asymmetric information about the existence of intellectual property. We provide an equilibrium analysis of (a) firms' incentives to communicate ideas for improvements of an industry standard, and (b) firms' decisions to disclose the existence of intellectual property to other participants of the standardization process.

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File URL: http://www.netinst.org/Ganglmair_Tarantino_11_15.pdf
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Paper provided by NET Institute in its series Working Papers with number 11-15.

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Length: 47 pages
Date of creation: Oct 2011
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:net:wpaper:1115
Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.NETinst.org/

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  1. Stein, Jeremy, 2008. "Conversations among Competitors," Scholarly Articles 2799052, Harvard University Department of Economics.
  2. Joseph Farrell & Carl Shapiro, 2008. "How Strong Are Weak Patents?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 98(4), pages 1347-69, September.
  3. Chaim Fershtman & Morton I. Kamien, 1990. "Cross Licensing of Complementary Technologies," Discussion Papers 866, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  4. Timothy S. Simcoe & Stuart J.H. Graham & Maryann P. Feldman, 2009. "Competing on Standards? Entrepreneurship, Intellectual Property, and Platform Technologies," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 18(3), pages 775-816, 09.
  5. Benjamin Chiao & Josh Lerner & Jean Tirole, 2005. "The Rules of Standard Setting Organizations: An Empirical Analysis," NBER Working Papers 11156, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  6. Thompson, George V., 1954. "Intercompany Technical Standardization in the Early American Automobile Industry," The Journal of Economic History, Cambridge University Press, vol. 14(01), pages 1-20, December.
  7. Anton, James J & Yao, Dennis A, 2002. "The Sale of Ideas: Strategic Disclosure, Property Rights, and Contracting," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 69(3), pages 513-31, July.
  8. Bernhard Ganglmair & Luke M. Froeb & Gregory J. Werden, 2012. "Patent Hold-Up and Antitrust: How A Well-Intentioned Rule Could Retard Innovation," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 60(2), pages 249-273, 06.
  9. Justus Baron & Tim Pohlmann, 2010. "Essential Patents and Coordination Mechanisms," Post-Print hal-00508792, HAL.
  10. James J. Anton & Dennis A. Yao, 2002. "The Sale of Ideas: Strategic Disclosure, Property Rights, and Contracting," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 69(3), pages 513-531.
  11. Carolin Haeussler & Lin Jiang & Jerry Thursby & Marie C. Thursby, 2009. "Specific and General Information Sharing Among Academic Scientists," NBER Working Papers 15315, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  12. James J. Anton & Dennis A. Yao, 2004. "Little Patents and Big Secrets: Managing Intellectual Property," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 35(1), pages 1-22, Spring.
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