Patent Disclosure in Standard Setting
We present a model of industry standard setting with two-sided asymmetric information about the existence of intellectual property. We provide an equilibrium analysis of (a) firms' incentives to communicate ideas for improvements of an industry standard, and (b) firms' decisions to disclose the existence of intellectual property to other participants of the standardization process.
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- James J. Anton & Dennis A. Yao, 2004. "Little Patents and Big Secrets: Managing Intellectual Property," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 35(1), pages 1-22, Spring.
- Jeremy C. Stein, 2007.
"Conversations Among Competitors,"
NBER Working Papers
13370, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Chaim Fershtman & Morton I. Kamien, 1990.
"Cross Licensing of Complementary Technologies,"
866, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- Perez-Castrillo, J. David & Sandonis, Joel, 1997. "Disclosure of know-how in research joint ventures," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 15(1), pages 51-75, February.
- Benjamin Chiao & Josh Lerner & Jean Tirole, 2005.
"The Rules of Standard Setting Organizations: An Empirical Analysis,"
NBER Working Papers
11156, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Benjamin Chiao & Josh Lerner & Jean Tirole, 2007. "The rules of standard-setting organizations: an empirical analysis," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 38(4), pages 905-930, December.
- Chiao, Benjamin & Lerner, Josh & Tirole, Jean, 2006. "The Rules of Standard Setting Organizations: an Empirical Analysis," IDEI Working Papers 388, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse.
- Chiao, Benjamin & Lerner, Josh & Tirole, Jean, 2007. "The Rules of Standard Setting Organizations: An Empirical Analysis," CEPR Discussion Papers 6141, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Farrell, Joseph & Shapiro, Carl, 2007.
"How Strong Are Weak Patents?,"
Competition Policy Center, Working Paper Series
qt8vg425vj, Competition Policy Center, Institute for Business and Economic Research, UC Berkeley.
- Thompson, George V., 1954. "Intercompany Technical Standardization in the Early American Automobile Industry," The Journal of Economic History, Cambridge University Press, vol. 14(01), pages 1-20, December.
- Bernhard Ganglmair & Luke M. Froeb & Gregory J. Werden, 2012. "Patent Hold-Up and Antitrust: How A Well-Intentioned Rule Could Retard Innovation," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 60(2), pages 249-273, 06.
- Carolin Haeussler & Lin Jiang & Jerry Thursby & Marie C. Thursby, 2009. "Specific and General Information Sharing Among Academic Scientists," NBER Working Papers 15315, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Justus Baron & Tim Pohlmann, 2010. "Essential Patents and Coordination Mechanisms," Post-Print hal-00508792, HAL.
- Timothy S. Simcoe & Stuart J.H. Graham & Maryann P. Feldman, 2009. "Competing on Standards? Entrepreneurship, Intellectual Property, and Platform Technologies," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 18(3), pages 775-816, 09.
- James J. Anton & Dennis A. Yao, 2002. "The Sale of Ideas: Strategic Disclosure, Property Rights, and Contracting," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 69(3), pages 513-531.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:net:wpaper:1115. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Nicholas Economides)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.