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Patent Disclosure in Standard Setting

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Abstract

We present a model of industry standard setting with two-sided asymmetric information about the existence of intellectual property. We provide an equilibrium analysis of (a) firms' incentives to communicate ideas for improvements of an industry standard, and (b) firms' decisions to disclose the existence of intellectual property to other participants of the standardization process.

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  • Bernhard Ganglmair & Emanuele Tarantino, 2011. "Patent Disclosure in Standard Setting," Working Papers 11-15, NET Institute.
    • Handle: RePEc:net:wpaper:1115
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    1. Benjamin Chiao & Josh Lerner & Jean Tirole, 2007. "The rules of standard-setting organizations: an empirical analysis," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 38(4), pages 905-930, December.
    2. James J. Anton & Dennis A. Yao, 2002. "The Sale of Ideas: Strategic Disclosure, Property Rights, and Contracting," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 69(3), pages 513-531.
    3. Timothy S. Simcoe & Stuart J.H. Graham & Maryann P. Feldman, 2009. "Competing on Standards? Entrepreneurship, Intellectual Property, and Platform Technologies," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 18(3), pages 775-816, September.
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    5. Carolin Haeussler & Lin Jiang & Jerry Thursby & Marie C. Thursby, 2009. "Specific and General Information Sharing Among Academic Scientists," NBER Working Papers 15315, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    6. Thompson, George V., 1954. "Intercompany Technical Standardization in the Early American Automobile Industry," The Journal of Economic History, Cambridge University Press, vol. 14(1), pages 1-20, January.
    7. Justus Baron & Tim Pohlmann, 2010. "Essential Patents and Coordination Mechanisms," Post-Print hal-00508792, HAL.
    8. Fershtman, Chaim & Kamien, Morton I., 1992. "Cross licensing of complementary technologies," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 10(3), pages 329-348, September.
    9. Joseph Farrell & Carl Shapiro, 2008. "How Strong Are Weak Patents?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 98(4), pages 1347-1369, September.
    10. Perez-Castrillo, J. David & Sandonis, Joel, 1997. "Disclosure of know-how in research joint ventures," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 15(1), pages 51-75, February.
    11. Bernhard Ganglmair & Luke M. Froeb & Gregory J. Werden, 2012. "Patent Hold-Up and Antitrust: How A Well-Intentioned Rule Could Retard Innovation," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 60(2), pages 249-273, June.
    12. James J. Anton & Dennis A. Yao, 2004. "Little Patents and Big Secrets: Managing Intellectual Property," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 35(1), pages 1-22, Spring.
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    Cited by:

    1. Baron, Justus & Ménière, Yann & Pohlmann, Tim, 2014. "Standards, consortia, and innovation," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 36(C), pages 22-35.
    2. Bernhard Ganglmair & Emanuele Tarantino, 2014. "Conversation with secrets," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 45(2), pages 273-302, June.
    3. Justus Baron & Yann Ménière & Tim Pohlmann, 2012. "Joint innovation in ICT standards: How consortia drive the volume of patent filings," Working Papers hal-00707291, HAL.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    patent holdup; patent disclosure; standard setting organizations; industry standards; disclosure rules; conversation; asymmetric information; Bertrand competition.;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
    • L15 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Information and Product Quality
    • O34 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Innovation; Research and Development; Technological Change; Intellectual Property Rights - - - Intellectual Property and Intellectual Capital

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