Essential Patents and Coordination Mechanisms
This article investigates the interplay between formal standards, essential patents and informal industry alliances such as consortia and patent pools. Building upon more than 6.200 declarations of essential patents to major international Standard Development Organizations (SDO), we investigate how informal standardization consortia and patent pools influence the number and timing of patent declarations to formal SDOs. This is the first thorough empirical investigation of the effectiveness of industry-driven coordination mechanisms addressing the problems raised by the high number of patents. We find that patent pools increase the number of declared essential patents controlling for the effects of standardization. On the other hand, informal consortia reduce the number of patent declarations at given standardization activity. These findings confirm results in the literature that patent pools provide incentives for strategic patent files and that informal standardization consortia have a regulatory function on the firms' patent strategies.
|Date of creation:||2010|
|Date of revision:|
|Note:||View the original document on HAL open archive server: http://hal-ensmp.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-00508792/en/|
|Contact details of provider:|| Web page: http://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/|
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:hal:journl:hal-00508792. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (CCSD)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.