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Imprecision of Central Bank Announcements and Credibility

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  • Daniel Laskar

    (PSE - Paris School of Economics - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - ENS-PSL - École normale supérieure - Paris - PSL - Université Paris Sciences et Lettres - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - ENPC - École des Ponts ParisTech - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement, PSE - Paris-Jourdan Sciences Economiques - ENS-PSL - École normale supérieure - Paris - PSL - Université Paris Sciences et Lettres - INRA - Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - ENPC - École des Ponts ParisTech - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

Abstract

We consider a model where the central bank faces a credibility problem in its announcements, but also cares about its credibility and, therefore, wants to make truthful announcements. We show that, although the central bank would be able to perfectly transmit its information to the private sector through precise announcements, the central bank may nonetheless prefer to make imprecise announcements. This choice of the central bank would be suboptimal from the point of view of society. However, if the central bank gives enough weight to making truthful announcements, this suboptimality disappears, because the central bank would then prefer precise announcements to imprecise announcements.

Suggested Citation

  • Daniel Laskar, 2010. "Imprecision of Central Bank Announcements and Credibility," PSE Working Papers halshs-00562595, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:psewpa:halshs-00562595
    Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://shs.hal.science/halshs-00562595
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    References listed on IDEAS

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