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Étude de la rémunération des dirigeants dans un modèle partenarial, le cas français


  • Anne Cazavan-Jeny

    (Accounting / Management Control Department - Essec Business School)

  • Julien Margaine

    (IÉSEG Recherche - lille)

  • Franck Missonier-Piera

    (emlyon business school)


Intense controversy has surrounded the publication of the level of Chief Executives Officers' (CEO) compensation over the last years. Some studies have shown a positive relationship between CEO pay and firm performance, in the US and in the UK. Executive compensation is also closely related to the corporate governance structure which differs significantly in France from that in the US and the UK. Traditionally, very little information has been made publicly available on executive compensation in France. In 2002, publicly listed companies were asked to report CEO and board of directors' compensation (NRE law, 15 May 2001). Using a sample of 110 firms listed in France on the 2002-2004 periods (SBF 120 index), the purpose of the study is to shed some light on compensation of CEOs in a country that is known to be rather conservative on that point. We test the determinants of CEO compensations defined by three measures: individual salary, annual bonus, and total CEO compensation. Preliminary results show that executive compensations are explained by size and market-based performance for the annual bonus. The findings on risk are more mitigate and indicate that the firm specific risk is negatively associated with CEO compensation, as Gray and Cannela (1997) have shown. Finally, the corporate governance variables have a significant impact on the level of executive compensations.

Suggested Citation

  • Anne Cazavan-Jeny & Julien Margaine & Franck Missonier-Piera, 2009. "Étude de la rémunération des dirigeants dans un modèle partenarial, le cas français," Post-Print halshs-00460167, HAL.
  • Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-00460167
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    References listed on IDEAS

    1. Heidi Vander Bauwhede & Marleen Willekens, 2008. "Disclosure on Corporate Governance in the European Union," Corporate Governance: An International Review, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 16(2), pages 101-115, March.
    2. Rajesh K. Aggarwal & Andrew A. Samwick, 1999. "The Other Side of the Trade-off: The Impact of Risk on Executive Compensation," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 107(1), pages 65-105, February.
    3. Andjelkovic, Aleksandar & Boyle, Glenn & McNoe, Warren, 2002. "Public disclosure of executive compensation: Do shareholders need to know?," Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, Elsevier, vol. 10(1), pages 97-117, January.
    4. Faccio, Mara & Lang, Larry H. P., 2002. "The ultimate ownership of Western European corporations," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 65(3), pages 365-395, September.
    5. Elston, Julie Ann & Goldberg, Lawrence G., 2003. "Executive compensation and agency costs in Germany," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 27(7), pages 1391-1410, July.
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