IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/
MyIDEAS: Log in (now much improved!) to save this paper

Collective Bargaining and Innovation in Germany: Cooperative Industrial Relations?

  • John T. Addison

    (University of Durham, University of South Carolina, IZA Bonn, and GEMF)

  • Paulino Teixeira

    ()

    (University of Coimbra/GEMF and IZA Bonn)

  • Katalin Evers

    (Institut für Arbeitsmarkt- und Berufsforschung der Bundesagentur für Arbeit)

  • Lutz Bellmann

    (Friedrich-Alexander-Universität Erlangen-Nürnberg, Institut für Arbeitsmarkt- und Berufsforschung der Bundesagentur für Arbeit, and IZA Bonn)

The effect of collective bargaining on innovation has long been in dispute. At the level of theory, the hold-up problem has been used to justify positive as well as negative effects of unionism. At the empirical level, although some would consider the North American evidence as cut and dried, this is not the case for other countries. In Europe there is some suggestion that certain industrial relations systems, either alone or in combination with the regulatory framework in which they are embedded, may tip the balance in favor of a beneficial union effect. In the present paper, we assemble nationally representative data for Germany – for many observers the exemplar of a cooperative industrial relations regime – to investigate the impact of collective bargaining on (several measures of) process innovation and product innovation. Our cross section and longitudinal analysis fails to indicate that unionism retards innovation. Indeed, in conjunction with workplace representation, collective bargaining at sectoral level might even be pro innovative.

To our knowledge, this item is not available for download. To find whether it is available, there are three options:
1. Check below under "Related research" whether another version of this item is available online.
2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.

Paper provided by GEMF, Faculty of Economics, University of Coimbra in its series GEMF Working Papers with number 2014-01.

as
in new window

Length: 63 pages
Date of creation: Jan 2015
Publication status: Published in Industrial Relations.
Handle: RePEc:gmf:wpaper:2014-01.
Contact details of provider: Postal:
Av. Dias da Silva, 165, 3004-512 COIMBRA

Phone: + 351 239 790 500
Fax: +351 239 403511
Web page: http://www.uc.pt/en/feuc/gemf/
Email:


More information through EDIRC

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

as in new window
  1. William Kerr & Adriana Kugler & David Autor, 2007. "Do Employment Protections Reduce Productivity? Evidence from U.S. States," Working Papers 07-04, Center for Economic Studies, U.S. Census Bureau.
  2. David H. Autor & John J. Donohue & Stewart J. Schwab, 2006. "The Costs of Wrongful-Discharge Laws," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 88(2), pages 211-231, May.
  3. Hermann Gartner & Thorsten Schenk & Claus Schnabel, 2010. "Wage cyclicality under different regimes of industrial relations," Kiel Working Papers 1654, Kiel Institute for the World Economy.
  4. Viral V. Acharya & Ramin P. Baghai & Krishnamurthy V. Subramanian, 2014. "Wrongful Discharge Laws and Innovation," Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 27(1), pages 301-346, January.
  5. Gabriele Fischer & Florian Janik & Dana Müller & Alexandra Schmucker, 2009. "European Data Watch: The IAB Establishment Panel - Things Users Should Know," Schmollers Jahrbuch : Journal of Applied Social Science Studies / Zeitschrift für Wirtschafts- und Sozialwissenschaften, Duncker & Humblot, Berlin, vol. 129(1), pages 133-148.
  6. Addison, John T. & Teixeira, Paulino & Evers, Katalin & Bellmann, Lutz, 2012. "Is the Erosion Thesis Overblown? Evidence from the Orientation of Uncovered Employers," IZA Discussion Papers 6658, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
  7. Schnabel, Claus & Wagner, Joachim, 1992. "Unions and innovation : Evidence from German micro data," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 39(3), pages 369-373, July.
  8. Tobias Brändle & Wolf Dieter Heinbach, 2010. "Opening Clauses in Cellective Bargaining Agreements: More Flexibility to Save Jobs?," IAW Discussion Papers 67, Institut für Angewandte Wirtschaftsforschung (IAW).
  9. Justus Haucap & Christian Wey, 2004. "Unionisation Structures and Innovation Incentives," Discussion Papers of DIW Berlin 398, DIW Berlin, German Institute for Economic Research.
  10. Wolf Heinbach, 2007. "Wages in wage-setting regimes with opening clauses," AStA Wirtschafts- und Sozialstatistisches Archiv, Springer;Deutsche Statistische Gesellschaft - German Statistical Society, vol. 1(3), pages 233-245, December.
  11. Ulph, A. M. & Ulph, D. T., 1994. "Labour markets and innovation: Ex-post bargaining," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 38(1), pages 195-210, January.
  12. Addison, John T & Schnabel, Claus & Wagner, Joachim, 2001. "Work Councils in Germany: Their Effects on Establishment Performance," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 53(4), pages 659-694, October.
  13. John T. Addison & Paulino Teixeira & Thomas Zwick, 2006. "The Impact of Works Councils on Wages," GEMF Working Papers 2006-08, GEMF, Faculty of Economics, University of Coimbra.
  14. Addison, John T & Chilton, John B, 1998. "Self-Enforcing Union Contracts: Efficient Investment and Employment," The Journal of Business, University of Chicago Press, vol. 71(3), pages 349-69, July.
  15. Ulph, Alistair & Ulph, David, 2001. " Strategic Innovation with Complete and Incomplete Labour Market Contracts," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 103(2), pages 265-282, June.
  16. Addison, John T & Schnabel, Claus & Wagner, Joachim, 1996. "German Works Councils, Profits, and Innovation," Kyklos, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 49(4), pages 555-582.
  17. Kornelius Kraft & Jörg Stank & Ralf Dewenter, 2011. "Co-determination and innovation," Cambridge Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 35(1), pages 145-172.
  18. David H. Autor & William R. Kerr & Adriana D. Kugler, 2007. "Does Employment Protection Reduce Productivity? Evidence From US States," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 117(521), pages 189-217, 06.
  19. Naercio Menezes-Filho & David Ulph & John Van Reenen, 1998. "R&D and Unionism: Comparative Evidence from British Companies and Establishments," ILR Review, Cornell University, ILR School, vol. 52(1), pages 45-63, October.
  20. Hristos Doucouliagos & Patrice Laroche, 2013. "Unions and Innovation: New Insights From the Cross-Country Evidence," Post-Print hal-01369294, HAL.
  21. Grout, Paul A, 1984. "Investment and Wages in the Absence of Binding Contracts: A Nash Bargining Approach," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 52(2), pages 449-460, March.
  22. Hirsch, Barry T. & Prasad, Kislaya, 1995. "Wage-employment determination and a union tax on capital: Can theory and evidence be reconciled?," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 48(1), pages 61-71, April.
  23. German Rodriguez & Irma Elo, 2003. "Intra-class correlation in random-effects models for binary data," Stata Journal, StataCorp LP, vol. 3(1), pages 32-46, March.
  24. Freeman, Richard B, 1976. "Individual Mobility and Union Voice in the Labor Market," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 66(2), pages 361-368, May.
  25. Malcomson, James M, 1983. "Trade Unions and Economic Efficiency," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 93(369a), pages 51-65, Supplemen.
  26. Colin Lawrence & Robert Z. Lawrence, 1985. "Manufacturing Wage Dispersion: An End Game Interpretation," Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Economic Studies Program, The Brookings Institution, vol. 16(1), pages 47-116.
  27. Baldwin, Carliss Y, 1983. "Productivity and Labor Unions: An Application of the Theory of Self-Enforcing Contracts," The Journal of Business, University of Chicago Press, vol. 56(2), pages 155-85, April.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:gmf:wpaper:2014-01.. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Ana Seiça)

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis using RePEc data.