Banking on seniority: the IMF and the sovereign’s creditors
The programs designed by the International Monetary Fund during the Global Financial Crisis have shown more awareness of the importance of domestic demand for the prospects of economic recovery. Yet, the IMF has continued to do little about the late payments made by governments to domestic creditors and suppliers. In contrast, the greater protection historically awarded by the IMF to foreign creditors has endured throughout the recent crisis. The paper suggests that, in order to adequately balance foreign creditor seniority and growth objectives, the IMF may sometimes need to emphasize equitable burden-sharing across categories of creditors rather than privilege the interests of international bond markets.
|Date of creation:||13 May 2014|
|Date of revision:|
|Contact details of provider:|| Web page: http://www.dallasfed.org/|
More information through EDIRC
|Order Information:|| Email: |
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Fernando Broner & Aitor Erce & Alberto Martin & Jaume Ventura, 2013.
"Sovereign Debt Markets in Turbulent Times: Creditor Discrimination and Crowding-Out Effects,"
NBER Working Papers
19676, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Broner, Fernando & Erce, Aitor & Martin, Alberto & Ventura, Jaume, 2014. "Sovereign debt markets in turbulent times: Creditor discrimination and crowding-out effects," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 61(C), pages 114-142.
- Broner, Fernando A & Erce, Aitor & Martin, Alberto & Ventura, Jaume, 2013. "Sovereign Debt Markets in Turbulent Times: Creditor Discrimination and Crowding-Out Effects," CEPR Discussion Papers 9761, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Fernando Broner & Aitor Erce & Alberto Martin & Jaume Ventura, 2013. "Sovereign debt markets in turbulent times: Creditor discrimination and crowding-out effects," Economics Working Papers 1372, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, revised Nov 2013.
- Fernando Broner & Aitor Erce & Alberto Martín & Jaume Ventura, 2013. "Sovereign Debt Markets in Turbulent Times: Creditor Discrimination and Crowding-Out Effects," Working Papers 701, Barcelona Graduate School of Economics.
- Fernando Broner & Alberto Martin & Jaume Ventura & Aitor Erce, 2014. "Sovereign debt markets in turbulent times: creditor discrimination and crowding-out effects," Banco de Espa�a Working Papers 1402, Banco de Espa�a.
- Lucio SIMPSON, 2006. "The Role Of The Imf In Debt Restructurings: Lending Into Arrears, Moral Hazard And Sustainability Concerns," G-24 Discussion Papers 40, United Nations Conference on Trade and Development.
- William Easterly, 2002.
"What did Structural Adjustment Adjust? The Association of Policies and Growth with Repeated IMF and World Bank Adjustment Loans,"
11, Center for Global Development.
- Easterly, William, 2005. "What did structural adjustment adjust?: The association of policies and growth with repeated IMF and World Bank adjustment loans," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 76(1), pages 1-22, February.
- Pablo Hernández de Cos & Enrique Moral-Benito, 2013. "Fiscal multipliers in turbulent times: the case of Spain," Banco de Espa�a Working Papers 1309, Banco de Espa�a.
- Javier Díaz-Cassou & Aitor Erce-Domínguez & Juan J. Vázquez-Zamora, 2008. "The role of the IMF in recent sovereign debt restructurings: Implications for the policy of lending into arrears," Banco de Espa�a Occasional Papers 0805, Banco de Espa�a.
- Alan J. Auerbach & Yuriy Gorodnichenko, 2010.
"Measuring the Output Responses to Fiscal Policy,"
NBER Working Papers
16311, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Raffer, Kunibert, 1990. "Applying chapter 9 insolvency to international debts: An economically efficient solution with a human face," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 18(2), pages 301-311, February.
- Aitor Erce, 2012. "Selective sovereign defaults," Globalization and Monetary Policy Institute Working Paper 127, Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:fip:feddgw:175. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Amy Chapman)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.