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Gender differences and stereotypes in strategic thinking

Author

Listed:
  • Maria Cubel

    () (Universitat de Barcelona)

  • Santiago Sanchez-Pages

    () (Universitat de Barcelona)

Abstract

Recent literature has emphasized that individuals display varying levels of strategic reasoning. This paper presents ten years worth of experimental data from two countries exploring the existence and endogeneity of gender differences in strategic sophistication. We report results from two experimental studies employing the beauty contest game, one from the classroom and one from the laboratory. We observe robust and signi?cant gender differences in strategic sophistication in favour of men in zero-stake situations. These differences disappear when a monetary prize is awarded. We also ?find that depth of strategic reasoning varies with gender priming. Females display signi?cantly higher levels of strategic sophistication than males when gender is made salient. This effect of gender priming is driven by females who believe women are superior in the game.

Suggested Citation

  • Maria Cubel & Santiago Sanchez-Pages, 2016. "Gender differences and stereotypes in strategic thinking," UB Economics Working Papers 2016/338, Universitat de Barcelona, Facultat d'Economia i Empresa, UB Economics.
  • Handle: RePEc:ewp:wpaper:338web
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    guessing game; strategic sophistication; gender; stereotype threat; beliefs.;

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • C91 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Individual Behavior
    • D81 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty
    • J16 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demographic Economics - - - Economics of Gender; Non-labor Discrimination

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