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University Prestige, Performance Evaluation, and Promotion: Estimating the employer learning model using personnel datasets

Author

Listed:
  • ARAKI Shota
  • KAWAGUCHI Daiji
  • ONOZUKA Yuki

Abstract

The employer learning model postulates that employers form employees' prior ability distribution from educational credentials and update its distribution by observing workers' performance on the job. This paper estimates the employer learning model for university-graduate white-collar workers using personnel datasets from two large manufacturers that contain rich information, including the name of the university from which the worker graduated, annual performance evaluations, and position in the promotion ladder. The estimates indicate that employers learn workers' ability relatively quickly through observing their performance on the job. The initial expectation errors on ability decline by a half in about three to four years in the two companies. Companies promote graduates of elite schools quickly mainly because they tend to perform better on the job.

Suggested Citation

  • ARAKI Shota & KAWAGUCHI Daiji & ONOZUKA Yuki, 2015. "University Prestige, Performance Evaluation, and Promotion: Estimating the employer learning model using personnel datasets," Discussion papers 15027, Research Institute of Economy, Trade and Industry (RIETI).
  • Handle: RePEc:eti:dpaper:15027
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Bordón, Paola & Braga, Breno, 2020. "Employer learning, statistical discrimination and university prestige," Economics of Education Review, Elsevier, vol. 77(C).
    2. Kenjiro Hirata & Shinpei Sano & Katsuya Takii, 2021. "How can a college's admissions policies help produce future business leaders?," OSIPP Discussion Paper 21E003, Osaka School of International Public Policy, Osaka University.
    3. Jong-Wha Lee & Dainn Wie, 2017. "Returns to Education and Skills in the Labor Market: Evidence from Japan and Korea," Asian Economic Policy Review, Japan Center for Economic Research, vol. 12(1), pages 139-160, January.
    4. Yuta Kuroda, 2023. "What do high-achieving graduates bring to nonacademic track high schools?," DSSR Discussion Papers 138, Graduate School of Economics and Management, Tohoku University.
    5. Matthieu Bunel & Dominique Meurs & Élisabeth Tovar, 2024. "Moving apart: job-driven residential mobility and the gender pay gap Evidence from a large industrial firm," Working Papers hal-04461137, HAL.
    6. Gavriil Agarkov & Daniil Sandler & Anastasia Sushchenko Anastasia Dmitrievna, 2018. "Financial and Social Success of University Graduates in the Ural Region," Economy of region, Centre for Economic Security, Institute of Economics of Ural Branch of Russian Academy of Sciences, vol. 1(4), pages 1312-1326.
    7. Robin Cowan & Giulia Rossello, 2018. "Emergent structures in faculty hiring networks, and the effects of mobility on academic performance," Scientometrics, Springer;Akadémiai Kiadó, vol. 117(1), pages 527-562, October.
    8. Weinstein, Russell, 2017. "University Selectivity, Initial Job Quality, and Longer-Run Salary," IZA Discussion Papers 10911, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    9. Daniel Kreisman & Jonathan Smith & Bondi Arifin, 2023. "Labor Market Signaling and the Value of College: Evidence from Resumes and the Truth," Journal of Human Resources, University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 58(6), pages 1820-1849.

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    JEL classification:

    • J46 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Particular Labor Markets - - - Informal Labor Market

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