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Human capital, marriage and regression

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  • Mukherjee, Diganta

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  • Mukherjee, Diganta, 2002. "Human capital, marriage and regression," ISER Working Paper Series 2002-15, Institute for Social and Economic Research.
    • Handle: RePEc:ese:iserwp:2002-15
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Shin, Sungwhee & Suh, Sang-Chul, 1996. "A mechanism implementing the stable rule in marriage problems," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 51(2), pages 185-189, May.
    2. Alcalde, Jose, 1996. "Implementation of Stable Solutions to Marriage Problems," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 69(1), pages 240-254, April.
    3. Lundberg, Shelly & Pollak, Robert A, 1994. "Noncooperative Bargaining Models of Marriage," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 84(2), pages 132-137, May.
    4. Manser, Marilyn & Brown, Murray, 1980. "Marriage and Household Decision-Making: A Bargaining Analysis," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 21(1), pages 31-44, February.
    5. Kai A. Konrad & Kjell Erik Lommerud, 2000. "The bargaining family revisited," Canadian Journal of Economics/Revue canadienne d'économique, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 33(2), pages 471-487, May.
    6. Bergstrom, Theodore C., 1997. "A survey of theories of the family," Handbook of Population and Family Economics, in: M. R. Rosenzweig & Stark, O. (ed.), Handbook of Population and Family Economics, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 2, pages 21-79, Elsevier.
    7. Lundberg, Shelly & Pollak, Robert A, 1993. "Separate Spheres Bargaining and the Marriage Market," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 101(6), pages 988-1010, December.
    8. Roth,Alvin E. & Sotomayor,Marilda A. Oliveira, 1992. "Two-Sided Matching," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521437882, January.
    9. Sonmez, Tayfun, 1997. "Games of Manipulation in Marriage Problems," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 20(2), pages 169-176, August.
    10. Gary S. Becker & Robert J. Barro, 1988. "A Reformulation of the Economic Theory of Fertility," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 103(1), pages 1-25.
    11. Gronau, Reuben, 1973. "The Intrafamily Allocation of Time: The Value of the Housewives' Time," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 63(4), pages 634-651, September.
    12. repec:bla:scandj:v:97:y:1995:i:4:p:581-601 is not listed on IDEAS
    13. Shelly Lundberg & Robert A. Pollak, 1996. "Bargaining and Distribution in Marriage," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 10(4), pages 139-158, Fall.
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