More Pain, No Gain for Greece: Is the Euro Worth the Costs of Pro-Cyclical Fiscal Policy and Internal Devaluation?
This week the Greek government reached agreement with the European authorities and the IMF for 130 billion euros in lending, as part of a new adjustment package to replace the current IMF program that began in May of 2010. Although the agreement should allow the government to avoid default in March, there are grave doubts as to whether the agreed upon program will lead the country to a point where it returns to growth, has a sustainable debt burden, and can borrow from private markets. The most important problem with the commitments that Greece has made in the past two years is that its fiscal policy is pro-cyclical – that is, the government has been, and is committed to, tightening its budget while the economy is in recession.
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- Mark Weisbrot & Rebecca Ray & Juan Montecino & Sara Kozameh, 2011. "The Argentine Success Story and its Implications," CEPR Reports and Issue Briefs 2011-21, Center for Economic and Policy Research (CEPR).
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- Ugo Panizza & Eduardo Levy Yeyati, 2006. "The Elusive Costs of Sovereign Defaults," Research Department Publications 4485, Inter-American Development Bank, Research Department.
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