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How much does responsibility matter in fairness measurement?

Author

Listed:
  • Laurence Jacquet
  • Zhiyang Jia
  • Thor O. Thoresen

    (CY Cergy Paris Université, THEMA)

Abstract

Empirical evidence suggests that social acceptance of redistribution depends on whether income differences result from preferences (of which individuals are responsible) or from circumstances. We propose a new empirical method that measures the importance of preferences in the distribution of welfare in the context of tax reforms. We compare two types of Compensating Variation: the standard CV and a new one (CVcirc), which is computed assuming that individuals differ only in circumstances. To obtain these metrics, we first estimate a structural job choice model that allows us to take the preferences/circumstances dyad into account. We then use the estimated parameters to compute our two metrics, leveraging a tax reform and applying a simulation approach `a la McFadden (1999). Implementing our method with Norwegian data, we find that both welfare metrics display a very similar distribution, except at the very top of the households’ income distribution, suggesting this is where responsibility matters.

Suggested Citation

  • Laurence Jacquet & Zhiyang Jia & Thor O. Thoresen, 2026. "How much does responsibility matter in fairness measurement?," Thema Working Papers 2026_1, THEMA (Théorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), CY Cergy-Paris University, ESSEC and CNRS.
  • Handle: RePEc:ema:worpap:2026_1
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    JEL classification:

    • F23 - International Economics - - International Factor Movements and International Business - - - Multinational Firms; International Business
    • H25 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Business Taxes and Subsidies
    • H26 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Tax Evasion and Avoidance
    • H32 - Public Economics - - Fiscal Policies and Behavior of Economic Agents - - - Firm

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