IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/cje/issued/v36y2003i4p911-922.html

Optimal redistribution when different workers are indistinguishable

Author

Listed:
  • Maurice Marchand
  • Pierre Pestieau
  • María Racionero

Abstract

Using the standard non linear income and commodity taxation framework, we examine the optimal policy to be adopted when the same labour disutility can receive two opposite interpretations: taste for leisure and activity limitation. In the absence of complete information about individual characteristics, an income tax does not allow distinguishing lazy from handicapped individuals. One may rely, however, on a combination of commodity and income taxes to redistribute from the former to the latter when they differ in their preferences for commodities.

Suggested Citation

  • Maurice Marchand & Pierre Pestieau & María Racionero, 2003. "Optimal redistribution when different workers are indistinguishable," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 36(4), pages 911-922, November.
    • Handle: RePEc:cje:issued:v:36:y:2003:i:4:p:911-922
    DOI: 10.1111/1540-5982.t01-3-00006
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://doi.org/10.1111/1540-5982.t01-3-00006
    Download Restriction: access restricted to subscribers
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1111/1540-5982.t01-3-00006?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version below or

    for a different version of it.

    Other versions of this item:

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Louis Kaplow, 2008. "Optimal Policy with Heterogeneous Preferences," NBER Working Papers 14170, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    2. Louis Kaplow, 2010. "Optimal Control of Externalities in the Presence of Income Taxation," STICERD - Public Economics Programme Discussion Papers 02, Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines, LSE.
    3. Pestieau, Pierre & Racionero, María, 2009. "Optimal redistribution with unobservable disability: Welfarist versus non-welfarist social objectives," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 53(6), pages 636-644, August.
    4. Boadway, Robin & Song, Zhen, 2016. "Indirect taxes for redistribution: Should necessity goods be favored?," Research in Economics, Elsevier, vol. 70(1), pages 64-88.
    5. Cremer Helmuth & Lozachmeur Jean-Marie & Pestieau Pierre, 2007. "Disability Testing and Retirement," The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 7(1), pages 1-34, February.
    6. Kaplow, Louis, 2010. "Optimal control of externalities in the presence of income taxation," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 58172, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    7. Laurence Jacquet, 2014. "Tagging and redistributive taxation with imperfect disability monitoring," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 42(2), pages 403-435, February.
    8. Kaplow, Louis, 2006. "On the undesirability of commodity taxation even when income taxation is not optimal," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 90(6-7), pages 1235-1250, August.
    9. Louis Kaplow, 2006. "Optimal Control of Externalities in the Presence of Income Taxation," NBER Working Papers 12339, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    10. Jacquet, Laurence & Van de Gaer, Dirk, 2011. "A comparison of optimal tax policies when compensation or responsibility matter," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 95(11), pages 1248-1262.
    11. Laurence Jacquet, 2010. "Take it or Leave it: Take-up, Optimal Transfer Programs, and Monitoring," CESifo Working Paper Series 3018, CESifo.
    12. Laurence JACQUET, 2009. "Take it or Leave it : Optimal Transfer Programs, Monitoring and Takeup," LIDAM Discussion Papers IRES 2009003, Université catholique de Louvain, Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales (IRES).
    13. Chul‐In Lee, 2011. "Commodity Taxation In Welfare States," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 49(1), pages 194-211, January.
    14. Sören Blomquist & Vidar Christiansen, 2008. "Taxation and Heterogeneous Preferences," FinanzArchiv: Public Finance Analysis, Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 64(2), pages 218-244, June.
    15. Laurence Jacquet & Dirk Van de Gaer, 2015. "Politiques fiscales optimales pour les bas revenus et principe de compensation," Revue économique, Presses de Sciences-Po, vol. 66(3), pages 579-600.
    16. By Louis Kaplow, 2012. "Optimal Control Of Externalities In The Presence Of Income Taxation," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 53(2), pages 487-509, May.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • H21 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Efficiency; Optimal Taxation
    • H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:cje:issued:v:36:y:2003:i:4:p:911-922. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Prof. Werner Antweiler (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/ceaaaea.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.