How private is private information? The ability to spot deception in an economic game
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- Belot, Michele & van de Ven, Jeroen, 2013. "How private is private information? The ability to spot deception in an economic game," SIRE Discussion Papers 2013-111, Scottish Institute for Research in Economics (SIRE).
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Keywordsdeception; lie detection; asymmetric information; face-to-face interaction; experiment;
- C91 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Individual Behavior
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- K4 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2013-12-29 (All new papers)
- NEP-CBE-2013-12-29 (Cognitive & Behavioural Economics)
- NEP-CTA-2013-12-29 (Contract Theory & Applications)
- NEP-EXP-2013-12-29 (Experimental Economics)
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