How private is private information? The ability to spot deception in an economic game
We provide experimental evidence on the ability to detect deceit in a buyer-seller game with asymmetric information. Sellers have private information about the buyer's valuation of a good and sometimes have incentives to mislead buyers. We examine if buyers can spot deception in face-to-face encounters. We vary (1) whether or not the buyer can interrogate the seller, and (2) the contextual richness of the situation. We find that the buyers' prediction accuracy is above chance levels, and that interrogation and contextual richness are important factors determining the accuracy. These results show that there are circumstances in which part of the information asymmetry is eliminated by people's ability to spot deception.
|Date of creation:||19 Dec 2013|
|Date of revision:|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: |
Web page: http://www.econ.ed.ac.uk/
More information through EDIRC
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:edn:esedps:237. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Gina Reddie)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.