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Incentives from Exchange Rate Regimes in an Institutional Context

  • Ashima Goyal

    (Indira Gandhi Institute of Development Research)

In a simple open economy macromodel, calibrated to the typical institutions and shocks of a densely populated emerging market economy, it is shown that a monetary stimulus preceding a temporary supply shock can abort inflation at minimum output cost, since of the appreciation of exchange rates, accompanying a fall in interest rates and rise in output. Analytic results obtained for two periods are generalized through simulations and validated through estimation. The results imply that one instrument can, in these conditions, achieve both domestic output and exchange rate objectives, since it creates correct incentives for foreign exchange traders who make profits in supporting the policy. Such a policy response is compatible with political constraints; it also imparts limited volatility to the nominal exchange rate around a trend competitive rate, thus encouraging hedging and deepening markets. But strategic interactions imply the optimal policy need not be chosen; supporting institutions are required to coordinate monetary, fiscal policy, and markets to the optimal equilibrium. The analysis gives useful degrees of freedom for Asian emerging markets migrating to exchange rate regimes compatible with more openness.

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File URL: http://saber.eaber.org/node/22375
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Paper provided by East Asian Bureau of Economic Research in its series Macroeconomics Working Papers with number 22375.

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Date of creation: Jan 2006
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Handle: RePEc:eab:macroe:22375
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  1. Jeanne, Olivier & Rose, Andrew K, 1999. "Noise Trading and Exchange Rate Regimes," CEPR Discussion Papers 2142, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  2. Philippe Aghion & Abhijit Banerjee & Thomas Piketty, 1999. "Dualism And Macroeconomic Volatility," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 114(4), pages 1359-1397, November.
  3. Bhattacharya, Utpal & Weller, Paul, 1992. "The Advantage to Hiding One's Hand: Speculation and Central Bank Intervention in the Foreign Exchange Market," CEPR Discussion Papers 737, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  4. Ghosh, Atish R., 2002. "Central bank secrecy in the foreign exchange market," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 46(2), pages 253-272, February.
  5. Svensson, Lars E.O., 1998. "Open-Economy Inflation Targeting," Seminar Papers 638, Stockholm University, Institute for International Economic Studies.
  6. Goyal, Ashima & Pujari, Ayan Kumar, 2005. "Identifying long run supply curve of India," MPRA Paper 24021, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  7. Goyal, Ashima, 2002. "Coordinating monetary and fiscal policies: a role for rules?," MPRA Paper 29200, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  8. Robert H. Bates & Avner Greif & Margaret Levi & Jean-Laurent Rosenthal, 1998. "Analytic Narratives," Economics Books, Princeton University Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 6355.
  9. Richard K. Lyons, 2006. "The Microstructure Approach to Exchange Rates," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 026262205x, June.
  10. Ashima Goyal & A. K. Jha, 2005. "Dictatorship, Democracy and Institutions: Macropolicy in China and India," Working Papers id:264, eSocialSciences.
  11. Gilles Oudiz & Jeffrey Sachs, 1985. "International Policy Coordination in Dynamic Macroeconomic Models," NBER Chapters, in: International Economic Policy Coordination, pages 274-330 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
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