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Permis de pollution et contraintes politiques dans un modèle à générations imbriquées

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  • Pierre-André Jouvet
  • Fabien Prieur

Abstract

We develop an overlapping generations model of growth in which production generates polluting harmful emissions. In order to control pollution, the government implements an emission permits system. However, subject to political constraints, it is not able to assign the optimal quota on emissions. Hence, in such a framework, regulating pollution solely by permits does not allow the decentralized economy to achieve the long run social optimum. Our contribution is then to show that the combination of the existing permits system with a policy intended to promote a price discrimination between agents on the permits market, is a mean not only to circumvent these rigidities but also to restore the Pareto optimality of the equilibrium.

Suggested Citation

  • Pierre-André Jouvet & Fabien Prieur, 2006. "Permis de pollution et contraintes politiques dans un modèle à générations imbriquées," EconomiX Working Papers 2006-21, University of Paris Nanterre, EconomiX.
    • Handle: RePEc:drm:wpaper:2006-21
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Jules-Eric TCHAPCHET TCHOUTO, 2008. "Tradable Emission Permits & Environmental Maintenance in an Overlapping Generations General Equilibrium Model," EcoMod2008 23800141, EcoMod.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D91 - Microeconomics - - Micro-Based Behavioral Economics - - - Role and Effects of Psychological, Emotional, Social, and Cognitive Factors on Decision Making
    • Q28 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Renewable Resources and Conservation - - - Government Policy
    • H23 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Externalities; Redistributive Effects; Environmental Taxes and Subsidies

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