Piercing the Veil of Uncertainty in Transboundary Pollution Agreements
This paper addresses the question of how uncertainty in costs and benefits affects the difficulty of reaching a voluntary agreement among sovereign states. A measure of “difficulty” is constructed related to side-payments necessary to make an agreement a Pareto-improving move. Using a simple model, it is shown that uncertainty actually makes agreement easier. Copyright Springer 2005
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Volume (Year): 31 (2005)
Issue (Month): 1 (05)
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