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Equity, Heterogeneity and International Environmental Agreements

Author

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  • Kolstad Charles D

    () (University of California, Santa Barbara)

Abstract

Much of the literature on international environmental agreements (IEA) considers the case of identical countries. There is a much smaller literature concerning the more complex but more realistic case of country heterogeneity. This paper involves modifying the standard static homogeneous country model of international environmental agreements. In particular, we consider two types of countries, differing in size as well as in marginal damage from pollution. Although the IEA does not have a unique size in this case, we do introduce two equilibrium refinements and explore the implications for coalition size. The two refinements include one based on efficiency and one based on equity.

Suggested Citation

  • Kolstad Charles D, 2010. "Equity, Heterogeneity and International Environmental Agreements," The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 10(2), pages 1-17, October.
  • Handle: RePEc:bpj:bejeap:v:10:y:2010:i:2:n:3
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Alistair Ulph, 2004. "Stable International Environmental Agreements with a Stock Pollutant, Uncertainty and Learning," Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, Springer, vol. 29(1), pages 53-73, July.
    2. Rubio, Santiago J. & Ulph, Alistair, 2007. "An infinite-horizon model of dynamic membership of international environmental agreements," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, pages 296-310.
    3. Claude d'Aspremont & Alexis Jacquemin & Jean Jaskold Gabszewicz & John A. Weymark, 1983. "On the Stability of Collusive Price Leadership," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 16(1), pages 17-25, February.
    4. Roger Guesnerie & Henry Tulkens (ed.), 2009. "The Design of Climate Policy," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262073021, January.
    5. Michael Finus, 2001. "Game Theory and International Environmental Cooperation," Books, Edward Elgar Publishing, number 2118, September.
    6. R. Mark Isaac & James M. Walker, 1988. "Group Size Effects in Public Goods Provision: The Voluntary Contributions Mechanism," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 103(1), pages 179-199.
    7. Carraro, Carlo & Siniscalco, Domenico, 1993. "Strategies for the international protection of the environment," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, pages 309-328.
    8. Charles Kolstad, 2005. "Piercing the Veil of Uncertainty in Transboundary Pollution Agreements," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, pages 21-34.
    9. Nicholas E. Burger & Charles D. Kolstad, 2009. "Voluntary Public Goods Provision, Coalition Formation, and Uncertainty," NBER Working Papers 15543, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    10. Carsten Helm, 1998. "International Cooperation Behind the Veil of Uncertainty – The Case of Transboundary Acidification," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, pages 185-201.
    11. Roger Guesnerie & Henry Tulkens, 2009. "The Design of Climate Policy," Post-Print halshs-00754871, HAL.
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Doruk Iris & Alessandro Tavoni, 2016. "Tipping Points and Loss Aversion in International Environmental Agreements," Working Papers 1603, Research Institute for Market Economy, Sogang University.
    2. Gary D. Libecap, 2014. "Addressing Global Environmental Externalities: Transaction Costs Considerations," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, pages 424-479.
    3. Robert Schmidt & Roland Strausz, 2015. "On the Timing of Climate Agreements," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, pages 521-547.
    4. Effrosyni Diamantoudi & Eftichios S. Sartzetakis, "undated". "International Environmental Agreements -The Role of Foresight," Economics Working Papers 2002-10, Department of Economics and Business Economics, Aarhus University.
    5. Brian Chi-ang Lin & Siqi Zheng & Doruk İriş, 2016. "Economic Targets And Loss-Aversion In International Environmental Cooperation," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, pages 624-648.
    6. Wang, Yiming, 2013. "A time-consistent model for cooperation in international pollution control," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 33(C), pages 500-506.
    7. repec:now:jnlsbe:102.00000065t is not listed on IDEAS
    8. Battisti, Michele & Delgado, Michael S. & Parmeter, Christopher F., 2015. "Evolution of the global distribution of carbon dioxide: A finite mixture analysis," Resource and Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 42(C), pages 31-52.
    9. Finus, Michael & McGinty, Matthew, 2015. "The Anti-Paradox of Cooperation: Diversity Pays!," Department of Economics Working Papers 46599, University of Bath, Department of Economics.
    10. Robert Schmidt & Roland Strausz, 2015. "On the Timing of Climate Agreements," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, pages 521-547.
    11. Effrosyni Diamantoudi & Eftichios Sartzetakis, 2015. "International environmental agreements: coordinated action under foresight," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 59(3), pages 527-546, August.
    12. Van Long, Ngo, 2016. "The Impacts of Other-Regarding Preferences and Ethical Choice on Environmental Outcomes: A Review of the Literature," Strategic Behavior and the Environment, now publishers, pages 1-35.

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