Intergenerational transfers of pollution rights and growth
We develop an overlapping generations growth model in which the individuals care about the environment. Many environmental policies suffer from institutional failures. We focus on the failure resulting from the delegation by the government of the exercise of the environmental policy to an administrative department. Though motivated by the department's expertise, the delegation principle may give rise to a conflict with social welfare maximization. This paper proposes an original policy mechanism of transfers of pollution rights capable of circumventing these failures and decentralizing optimal growth atcompetitive equilibrium.
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