IDEAS home Printed from
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Tax evasion,tax corruption and stochastic growth


  • Fred Celimene

    () (CEREGMIA, Université des Antilles et de la Guyane)

  • Gilles Dufrenot

    () (Aix-Marseille Université)

  • Gisele Mophou

    () (CEREGMIA, Université des Antilles et de la Guyane)

  • Gaston N'Guerekata

    (Morgan State University, Baltimore, MD, USA)


This paper presents a continuous time stochastic growth model to study the effects of tax evasion and tax corruption on the level and volatility of private investment and public spending. Our results suggest that there do exist several regimes of mean growth and growth volatility, depending upon the consumer's degree of risk aversion, the tax income yield, the risk-adjusted return of the agent's portfolio, the productivity of public spending. We find that public spending is described asymptotically by an incomplete upper Gamma distribution, while private capital is described by a power law distribution. Depending upon the values of the parameters of these distributions, growth can be characterized by extreme values (high volatility) when the return to taxation lies under a certain threshold and/or when the risk-adjusted return of investing the proceeds of illegal activities evolves above a given threshold. We provide an empirical illustration of the model.

Suggested Citation

  • Fred Celimene & Gilles Dufrenot & Gisele Mophou & Gaston N'Guerekata, 2013. "Tax evasion,tax corruption and stochastic growth," Documents de Travail 2013-05, CEREGMIA, Université des Antilles et de la Guyane.
  • Handle: RePEc:crg:wpaper:dt2013-05

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL:
    File Function: First version, 2013
    Download Restriction: no

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    1. Turnovsky, Stephen J., 1993. "The impact of terms of trade shocks on a small open economy: A stochastic analysis," Journal of International Money and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 12(3), pages 278-297, June.
    2. Frode Brevik & Manfred Gärtner, 2008. "Can tax evasion tame Leviathan governments?," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 136(1), pages 103-122, July.
    3. Barreto, Raul A., 2000. "Endogenous corruption in a neoclassical growth model," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 44(1), pages 35-60, January.
    4. Cerqueti, Roy & Coppier, Raffaella, 2011. "Economic growth, corruption and tax evasion," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 28(1-2), pages 489-500, January.
    5. Ratbek Dzhumashev, 2007. "Corruption, Uncertainty And Growth," Monash Economics Working Papers 15-07, Monash University, Department of Economics.
    6. Paolo Mauro, 2004. "The Persistence of Corruption and Slow Economic Growth," IMF Staff Papers, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 51(1), pages 1-1.
    7. Turnovsky, Stephen J., 1999. "On the role of government in a stochastically growing open economy," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 23(5-6), pages 873-908, April.
    8. Hindriks, Jean & Keen, Michael & Muthoo, Abhinay, 1999. "Corruption, extortion and evasion," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 74(3), pages 395-430, December.
    9. Been-Lon Chen, 2003. "Tax Evasion in a Model of Endogenous Growth," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 6(2), pages 381-403, April.
    10. Isaac Ehrlich & Francis T. Lui, 1999. "Bureaucratic Corruption and Endogenous Economic Growth," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 107(S6), pages 270-293, December.
    11. Lin, Wen-Zhung & Yang, C. C., 2001. "A dynamic portfolio choice model of tax evasion: Comparative statics of tax rates and its implication for economic growth," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 25(11), pages 1827-1840, November.
    12. Grinols, Earl L. & Turnovsky, Stephen J., 1993. "Risk, the financial market, and macroeconomic equilibrium," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 17(1-2), pages 1-36.
    13. Sanyal, Amal & Gang, Ira N & Goswami, Omkar, 2000. "Corruption, Tax Evasion and the Laffer Curve," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 105(1-2), pages 61-78, October.
    14. Allingham, Michael G. & Sandmo, Agnar, 1972. "Income tax evasion: a theoretical analysis," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 1(3-4), pages 323-338, November.
    15. Friedrich Schneider & Andreas Buehn & Claudio Montenegro, 2010. "New Estimates for the Shadow Economies all over the World," International Economic Journal, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 24(4), pages 443-461.
    16. Friedman, Eric & Johnson, Simon & Kaufmann, Daniel & Zoido-Lobaton, Pablo, 2000. "Dodging the grabbing hand: the determinants of unofficial activity in 69 countries," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 76(3), pages 459-493, June.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)


    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.

    Cited by:

    1. repec:spr:annopr:v:261:y:2018:i:1:d:10.1007_s10479-017-2618-9 is not listed on IDEAS
    2. repec:eee:jrpoli:v:54:y:2017:i:c:p:149-156 is not listed on IDEAS

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • H26 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Tax Evasion and Avoidance
    • D91 - Microeconomics - - Micro-Based Behavioral Economics - - - Role and Effects of Psychological, Emotional, Social, and Cognitive Factors on Decision Making
    • O41 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Growth and Aggregate Productivity - - - One, Two, and Multisector Growth Models

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:


    Access and download statistics


    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:crg:wpaper:dt2013-05. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Janis Hilaricus). General contact details of provider: .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.