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Corrupt Bureaucracy and Growth

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  • Djumashev, Ratbek

Abstract

In this paper, we analyze implications of corruption on growth. We extend existing growth models by incorporating ubiquitous corruption as a by-product of the public sector. Corruption affects both taxation and public good provision, and therefore causes income redistribution and inefficiencies in the public sector. These effects of corruption lead to lower growth through distortions of investment incentives and resources allocation.

Suggested Citation

  • Djumashev, Ratbek, 2006. "Corrupt Bureaucracy and Growth," MPRA Paper 2082, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    • Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:2082
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    File URL: https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/2082/1/MPRA_paper_2082.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Matthew Terry RIVI & Ishmael OGBORU & Dooshima Jennifer RIVI, 2020. "An Analysis of the Long-Run Relationship Between Corruption and Debt Sustainability in Nigeria," RAIS Journal for Social Sciences, Research Association for Interdisciplinary Studies, vol. 4(2), pages 71-88, November.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Corruption; growth; public goods; tax evasion;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • H40 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - General
    • D92 - Microeconomics - - Micro-Based Behavioral Economics - - - Intertemporal Firm Choice, Investment, Capacity, and Financing
    • O17 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Formal and Informal Sectors; Shadow Economy; Institutional Arrangements
    • E60 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - General

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