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Corruption, Uncertainty And Growth

  • Ratbek Dzhumashev

Corruption in the public sector erodes tax compliance and leads to higher tax evasion. Moreover, corrupt public officials abuse their public power to extort bribes from the private agents. In both types of interaction with the public sector, the private agents are bound to face uncertainty with respect to their disposable incomes. To analyse effects of this uncertainty, a stochastic dynamic growth model with the public sector is examined. It is shown that deterministic excessive red tape and corruption deteriorate the growth potential through income redistribution and public sector inefficiencies. Most importantly, it is demonstrated that the increase in corruption via higher uncertainty exerts adverse effects on capital accumulation, thus leading to lower growth rates.

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File URL: http://www.buseco.monash.edu.au/eco/research/papers/2007/1507corruptiondjumashev.pdf
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Paper provided by Monash University, Department of Economics in its series Monash Economics Working Papers with number 15-07.

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Length: 14 pages
Date of creation: 2007
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:mos:moswps:2007-15
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