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Tax evasion, tax corruption and stochastic growth

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  • Célimène, Fred
  • Dufrénot, Gilles
  • Mophou, Gisèle
  • N'Guérékata, Gaston

Abstract

This paper presents a continuous time stochastic growth model to study the effects of tax evasion and tax corruption on the level and volatility of private investment and public spending that are both factors of growth. The model highlights several channels through which the mean and volatility of these variables are affected. We first stress the role of equity markets, showing that the evasion outcome for the private sector is not necessarily viewed as a burden. Equity market performs here have the same role as a policy of tax exemption. In societies in which the share of private investment in percentage of GDP is growing, in which tax cheaters usually choose to shelter the proceeds of their illegal activities from the official financial institutions, and in which the productivity of public spending is often low, tax evasion and tax corruption may contribute to the development of private capital if people find an opportunity to invest the proceeds of their illegal activities in equity markets.

Suggested Citation

  • Célimène, Fred & Dufrénot, Gilles & Mophou, Gisèle & N'Guérékata, Gaston, 2016. "Tax evasion, tax corruption and stochastic growth," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 52(PA), pages 251-258.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:ecmode:v:52:y:2016:i:pa:p:251-258
    DOI: 10.1016/j.econmod.2014.10.055
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    2. Zhu, Jun & Ho, Kung-Cheng & Luo, Sijia & Peng, Langchuan, 2023. "Pandemic and tax avoidance: Cross-country evidence," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 124(C).
    3. Célimène, Fred & Dufrénot, Gilles & Mophou, Gisèle & N'Guérékata, Gaston, 2016. "Tax evasion, tax corruption and stochastic growth," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 52(PA), pages 251-258.
    4. Jaylson Jair da Silveira & Gilberto Tadeu Lima & Leonardo Barros Torres, 2025. "Persistence and Pervasiveness of Tax Evasion: An Evolutionary Analytical Framework," International Journal of Economics and Finance, Canadian Center of Science and Education, vol. 17(2), pages 1-87, February.
    5. Jurušs Māris, 2017. "Criteria for Defining Tax Evasion as Tax Terrorism," Economics and Business, Sciendo, vol. 30(1), pages 102-112, April.
    6. Mohammad Nurunnabi, 2018. "Tax evasion and religiosity in the Muslim world: the significance of Shariah regulation," Quality & Quantity: International Journal of Methodology, Springer, vol. 52(1), pages 371-394, January.
    7. Dzhumashev, Ratbek & Levaggi, Rosella & Menoncin, Francesco, 2023. "Optimal tax enforcement with productive public inputs," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 126(C).
    8. Dongmin Kong & Yue Zhang & Ni Qin, 2025. "Anti-corruption campaign and corporate tax evasion: evidence from China," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 32(1), pages 1-50, February.
    9. Bethencourt, Carlos & Kunze, Lars, 2020. "Social norms and economic growth in a model with labor and capital income tax evasion," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 86(C), pages 170-182.
    10. Rind, Asad Ali & Abbassi, Wajih & Allaya, Manel & Hammouda, Amira, 2022. "Local peers and firm misconduct: The role of sustainability and competition," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 116(C).
    11. Leonardo Barros Torres & Jaylson Jair da Silveira, Gilberto Tadeu Lima, 2022. "To Comply or not to Comply: Persistent Heterogeneity in Tax Compliance and Macroeconomic Dynamics," Working Papers, Department of Economics 2022_04, University of São Paulo (FEA-USP).
    12. Tarverdi, Yashar & Saha, Shrabani & Campbell, Neil, 2019. "Governance, democracy and development," Economic Analysis and Policy, Elsevier, vol. 63(C), pages 220-233.
    13. Leonardo Barros Torres & Gilberto Tadeu Lima & Jaylson Jair da Silveira, 2024. "Endogenous Tax Compliance and Macroeconomic Performance Driven by Satisficing Evolutionary Dynamics," Working Papers, Department of Economics 2024_10, University of São Paulo (FEA-USP).
    14. Gaetano T. Spartà & Gabriele Stabile, 2018. "Tax compliance with uncertain income: a stochastic control model," Annals of Operations Research, Springer, vol. 261(1), pages 289-301, February.
    15. Bayramov, Vugar & Abbas, Gulnara, 2017. "Oil shock in the Caspian Basin: Diversification policy and subsidized economies," Resources Policy, Elsevier, vol. 54(C), pages 149-156.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Stochastic growth; Tax evasion; Tax corruption;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • H26 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Tax Evasion and Avoidance
    • D91 - Microeconomics - - Micro-Based Behavioral Economics - - - Role and Effects of Psychological, Emotional, Social, and Cognitive Factors on Decision Making
    • O41 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Growth and Aggregate Productivity - - - One, Two, and Multisector Growth Models

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