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Bribes, Lobbying and Industrial Structure

Author

Listed:
  • Roy Cerqueti

    (Sapienza University of Rome
    School of Business, London South Bank University)

  • Raffaella Coppier

    (University of Macerata)

  • Gustavo Piga

    (University of Rome Tor Vergata)

Abstract

This paper deals with the relationship between regulatory compliance, bureaucratic corruption, lobbying and the industrial structure of a country. We show that lobbying and bureaucratic corruption can coexist at the macro level when we allow for heterogeneity in firm size. Countries with similar level of development are often characterized by very different industrial structures: we show the implications this has for the level of compliance, corruption and lobbying in that country. Welfare implications of our model point toward encouraging policies that support the small business sector of an economy and toward flexible regulatory policies meant to suppress regulation for small enough firms.

Suggested Citation

  • Roy Cerqueti & Raffaella Coppier & Gustavo Piga, 2021. "Bribes, Lobbying and Industrial Structure," Italian Economic Journal: A Continuation of Rivista Italiana degli Economisti and Giornale degli Economisti, Springer;Società Italiana degli Economisti (Italian Economic Association), vol. 7(3), pages 439-460, November.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:italej:v:7:y:2021:i:3:d:10.1007_s40797-021-00150-7
    DOI: 10.1007/s40797-021-00150-7
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Marco Catola & Silvia Leoni, 2023. "Pollution Abatement and Lobbying in a Cournot Game. An Agent-Based Modelling approach," Discussion Papers 2023/294, Dipartimento di Economia e Management (DEM), University of Pisa, Pisa, Italy.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Bureaucratic corruption; Lobbying; Industrial organization;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • H26 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Tax Evasion and Avoidance
    • L51 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - Economics of Regulation
    • K42 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law

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