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Balanced collective contributions, the equal allocation of non-separable costs and application to data sharing games

Author

Listed:
  • Sylvain Béal

    () (CRESE, Université de Franche-Comté)

  • Marc Deschamps

    () (Université de Lorraine, BETA (CNRS 7522) and GREDEG (CNRS UMR 7321))

  • Philippe Solal

    () (Université de Saint-Etienne, CNRS UMR 5824 GATE Lyon Saint-Etienne)

Abstract

The axiom of Balanced collective contributions is introduced as a collective variant of the axiom of Balanced contributions proposed by Myerson (1980). It requires that the identical average impact of the withdrawal of any agent from a game on the remaining population. It turns out that Balanced collective contributions and the classical axiom of Efficiency characterize the equal allocation of non-separable costs, an allocation rule which is extensively used in cost allocation problems and in accounting. For instance, the equal allocation of non-separable costs coincides with the Nucleolus on the class of data sharing games within the European REACH legislation. While our result does not hold on data sharing games, we provide comparable characterizations of the equal allocation of non-separable costs and the Shapley value.

Suggested Citation

  • Sylvain Béal & Marc Deschamps & Philippe Solal, 2014. "Balanced collective contributions, the equal allocation of non-separable costs and application to data sharing games," Working Papers 2014-02, CRESE.
  • Handle: RePEc:crb:wpaper:2014-02
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    File URL: http://crese.univ-fcomte.fr/WP-2014-02.pdf
    File Function: First version, 2014
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. repec:cor:louvrp:-2481 is not listed on IDEAS
    2. Pierre Dehez & Daniela Tellone, 2013. "Data Games: Sharing Public Goods with Exclusion," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 15(4), pages 654-673, August.
    3. Sylvain Béal & Marc Deschamps, 2016. "On compensation schemes for data sharing within the European REACH legislation," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, pages 157-181.
    4. Pierre Dehez & Daniela Tellone, 2013. "Data Games: Sharing Public Goods with Exclusion," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 15(4), pages 654-673, August.
    5. Theo Driessen & Anna Khmelnitskaya & Jordi Sales, 2012. "1-concave basis for TU games and the library game," TOP: An Official Journal of the Spanish Society of Statistics and Operations Research, Springer;Sociedad de Estadística e Investigación Operativa, vol. 20(3), pages 578-591, October.
    6. Herings, P. Jean Jacques & van der Laan, Gerard & Talman, Dolf, 2008. "The average tree solution for cycle-free graph games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 62(1), pages 77-92, January.
    7. Stef Tijs & Judith Timmer & Rodica Brânzei, 2006. "Compensations in Information Collecting Situations: A Cooperative Approach," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 8(2), pages 181-191, May.
    8. William Thomson, 2001. "On the axiomatic method and its recent applications to game theory and resource allocation," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 18(2), pages 327-386.
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    Cited by:

    1. Béal, Sylvain & Ferrières, Sylvain & Rémila, Eric & Solal, Philippe, 2016. "Axiomatic characterizations under players nullification," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, pages 47-57.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Balanced collective contributions; Balanced contributions; Equal allocation of non-separable costs; Shapley value; Data games.;

    JEL classification:

    • C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
    • D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
    • K32 - Law and Economics - - Other Substantive Areas of Law - - - Energy, Environmental, Health, and Safety Law
    • L65 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Manufacturing - - - Chemicals; Rubber; Drugs; Biotechnology; Plastics

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