IDEAS home Printed from
MyIDEAS: Login to save this paper or follow this series

On compensation schemes for data sharing within the european REACH legislation

  • Sylvain Béal


    (CRESE, Université de Franche-Comté)

  • Marc Deschamps


    (Université de Nice Sophia-Antipolis, GREDEG (CNRS UMR 7321) and BETA (CNRS 7522))

Article 30 of Regulation (EC) No 1907/2006 concerns the sharing of data between users of a chemical substance. We study this bargaining problem by means of a special class of games in coalitional form called data games (Dehez and Tellone, 2013). For such problems, compensation schemes specify how the data owners should be compensated by the agents in needs of data. On the class of data games, the Core, the Nucleolus and the Shapley value provide relevant compensation schemes. We provide three comparable axiomatic characterizations of the set of all (additive) compensation schemes belonging to the Core, of the Nucleolus and of the Shapley value. The axioms reflects principles of various theories of justice.

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL:
File Function: First version, 2014
Download Restriction: no

Paper provided by CRESE in its series Working Papers with number 2014-01.

in new window

Length: 13 pages
Date of creation: Feb 2014
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:crb:wpaper:2014-01
Contact details of provider: Postal:
45 D Avenue de l'observatoire, 25030 Besançon cedex

Phone: 03 81 66 65 80
Fax: 03 81 66 65 76
Web page:

More information through EDIRC

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

as in new window
  1. William Thomson, 2001. "On the axiomatic method and its recent applications to game theory and resource allocation," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 18(2), pages 327-386.
  2. André Casajus & Helfried Labrenz & Tobias Hiller, 2009. "Majority shareholder protection by variable qualified majority rules," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 28(1), pages 9-18, August.
  3. Spiller, Pablo T., 1992. "Rationality, decision rules, and collegial courts," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 12(2), pages 186-190, June.
  4. Pierre Dehez & Daniela Tellone, 2013. "Data Games: Sharing Public Goods with Exclusion," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 15(4), pages 654-673, 08.
  5. Joël-Thomas Ravix & Sylvain Béal & Marc Deschamps & Olivier Sautel, 2010. "Les informations exigées par la législation REACH : analyse du partage des coûts," Post-Print halshs-00726514, HAL.
  6. Braham, Matthew & Steffen, Frank, 2002. "Voting rules in insolvency law: a simple-game theoretic approach," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 22(4), pages 421-442, December.
  7. Silvia Fedeli & Francesco Forte, 2001. "Voting Powers and the Efficiency of the Decision-Making Process in the European Council of Ministers," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 12(1), pages 5-38, July.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:crb:wpaper:2014-01. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Christian At)

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis using RePEc data.