Les informations exigées par la législation REACH : Analyse du partage des coûts
This article addresses the question of data-sharing mechanisms under REACH. The members of an information exchange forum have to share their data. This exchange requires the adoption of a compensation scheme : the owner of a data receives a monetary compensation in return for the access to his/her data. We are interested in the choice of a compensation scheme that would be fair for all participants. In order to answer this question, the exchange of information is modeled as in Dehez and Tellone . We list a collection of axioms for the compensation schemes. Various combinations of these axioms characterize several compensation schemes. Some of them coincide with well-known solutions of an associated cooperative game with transferable utility.
Volume (Year): 120 (2010)
Issue (Month): 6 ()
|Contact details of provider:|| Web page: http://www.cairn.info/revue-d-economie-politique.htm|