Les informations exigées par la législation REACH : analyse du partage des coûts
This article addresses the question of data-sharing mechanisms under REACH. The members of an information exchange forum have to share their data. This exchange requires the adoption of a compensation scheme : the owner of a data receives a monetary compensation in return for the access to his/her data. We are interested in the choice of a compensation scheme that would be fair for all participants. In order to answer this question, the exchange of information is modeled as in Dehez and Tellone . We list a collection of axioms for the compensation schemes. Various combinations of these axioms characterize several compensation schemes. Some of them coincide with well-known solutions of an associated cooperative game with transferable utility.
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|Date of creation:||2010|
|Publication status:||Published in Revue d Economie Politique, Editions Dalloz, 2010, 120 (6), pp.991-1014|
|Note:||View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-00726514|
|Contact details of provider:|| Web page: https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/|