IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/gre/wpaper/2018-20.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Procedural and Optimization Implementation of the Weighted ENSC Value

Author

Listed:
  • Dongshuang Hou

    (Department of Applied Mathematics, Northwestern Polytechnical University)

  • Aymeric Lardon

    (Université Côte d'Azur, France
    GREDEG CNRS)

  • Panfei Sun

    (Department of Applied Mathematics, Northwestern Polytechnical University)

  • Hao Sun

    (Department of Applied Mathematics, Northwestern Polytechnical University)

Abstract

The main purpose of this article is to introduce the weighted ENSC value for cooperative transferable utility games which takes into account players' selfishness about the payoff allocations. Similarly to Shapley's idea of a one-by-one formation of the grand coalition (Shapley, 1953), we first provide a procedural implementation of the weighted ENSC value depending on players' selfishness as well as their marginal contributions to the grand coalition. Second, in the spirit of the nucleolus (Schmeidler, 1969), we prove that the weighted ENSC value is obtained by lexicographically minimizing a complaint vector associated with a new complaint criterion relying on players' selfishness.

Suggested Citation

  • Dongshuang Hou & Aymeric Lardon & Panfei Sun & Hao Sun, 2018. "Procedural and Optimization Implementation of the Weighted ENSC Value," GREDEG Working Papers 2018-20, Groupe de REcherche en Droit, Economie, Gestion (GREDEG CNRS), University of Nice Sophia Antipolis.
  • Handle: RePEc:gre:wpaper:2018-20
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.gredeg.cnrs.fr/working-papers/GREDEG-WP-2018-20.pdf
    File Function: First version, 2018
    Download Restriction: no

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Moulin, Herve, 1985. "The separability axiom and equal-sharing methods," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 36(1), pages 120-148, June.
    2. Pierre Dehez & Daniela Tellone, 2013. "Data Games: Sharing Public Goods with Exclusion," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 15(4), pages 654-673, August.
    3. Pierre Dehez & Daniela Tellone, 2013. "Data Games: Sharing Public Goods with Exclusion," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 15(4), pages 654-673, August.
    4. Forsythe Robert & Horowitz Joel L. & Savin N. E. & Sefton Martin, 1994. "Fairness in Simple Bargaining Experiments," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 6(3), pages 347-369, May.
    5. SCHMEIDLER, David, 1969. "The nucleolus of a characteristic function game," CORE Discussion Papers RP 44, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
    6. repec:wly:navlog:v:12:y:1965:i:3:p:223-259 is not listed on IDEAS
    7. Sylvain Béal & Marc Deschamps & Philippe Solal, 2016. "Comparable Axiomatizations of Two Allocation Rules for Cooperative Games with Transferable Utility and Their Subclass of Data Games," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 18(6), pages 992-1004, December.
    8. Marcin Malawski, 2013. "“Procedural” values for cooperative games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 42(1), pages 305-324, February.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    More about this item

    Keywords

    TU-game; weighted ENSC value; allocation scenario; selissh complaint;

    JEL classification:

    • C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:gre:wpaper:2018-20. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Patrice Bougette). General contact details of provider: http://edirc.repec.org/data/credcfr.html .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.