IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/spr/aqjoor/v22y2024i1d10.1007_s10288-023-00538-4.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

A generalization of the CIS value for cooperative cost games

Author

Listed:
  • Dongshuang Hou

    (Northwestern Polytechnical University)

  • Weibin Han

    (South China Normal University)

  • Genjiu Xu

    (Northwestern Polytechnical University)

  • Yifan Feng

    (Northwestern Polytechnical University)

Abstract

In this paper, we enrich the model of cooperative cost games by introducing the notion of selfishness levels for players. With this notion, we introduce a new value called the generalized CIS value. To reveal the fairness of the generalized CIS value, we characterize this value through three perspectives. The first one is to provide a procedural implementation for this value, and show that the outcome of this implementation process coincides with the generalized CIS value. Secondly, by applying the optimization theory, we show that the generalized CIS value may minimize the players’ complaints from the perspective of average complaint. Lastly, we approach the generalized CIS value axiomatically by using the efficiency property and the equal maximal complaint property.

Suggested Citation

  • Dongshuang Hou & Weibin Han & Genjiu Xu & Yifan Feng, 2024. "A generalization of the CIS value for cooperative cost games," 4OR, Springer, vol. 22(1), pages 17-30, March.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:aqjoor:v:22:y:2024:i:1:d:10.1007_s10288-023-00538-4
    DOI: 10.1007/s10288-023-00538-4
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://link.springer.com/10.1007/s10288-023-00538-4
    File Function: Abstract
    Download Restriction: Access to the full text of the articles in this series is restricted.
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1007/s10288-023-00538-4?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Moulin, Herve, 1985. "The separability axiom and equal-sharing methods," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 36(1), pages 120-148, June.
    2. Dongshuang Hou & Aymeric Lardon & Panfei Sun & Hao Sun, 2019. "Procedural and Optimization Implementation of the Weighted ENSC value," Post-Print halshs-01930832, HAL.
    3. Yuan Ju & Peter Borm & Pieter Ruys, 2007. "The consensus value: a new solution concept for cooperative games," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 28(4), pages 685-703, June.
    4. van den Brink, Rene, 2007. "Null or nullifying players: The difference between the Shapley value and equal division solutions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 136(1), pages 767-775, September.
    5. Youngsub Chun & Boram Park, 2012. "Population solidarity, population fair-ranking, and the egalitarian value," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 41(2), pages 255-270, May.
    6. SCHMEIDLER, David, 1969. "The nucleolus of a characteristic function game," LIDAM Reprints CORE 44, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
    7. Marcin Malawski, 2013. "“Procedural” values for cooperative games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 42(1), pages 305-324, February.
    8. Panfei Sun & Dongshuang Hou & Hao Sun & Theo Driessen, 2017. "Optimization Implementation and Characterization of the Equal Allocation of Nonseparable Costs Value," Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications, Springer, vol. 173(1), pages 336-352, April.
    9. Ruiz, Luis M & Valenciano, Federico & Zarzuelo, Jose M, 1996. "The Least Square Prenucleolus and the Least Square Nucleolus. Two Values for TU Games Based on the Excess Vector," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 25(1), pages 113-134.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Zhang, Li & Xu, Genjiu & Sun, Hao & Li, Wenzhong, 2023. "Players’ dummification and the dummified egalitarian non-separable contribution value," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 226(C).
    2. Zheng, Xiao-Xue & Li, Deng-Feng & Liu, Zhi & Jia, Fu & Lev, Benjamin, 2021. "Willingness-to-cede behaviour in sustainable supply chain coordination," International Journal of Production Economics, Elsevier, vol. 240(C).
    3. Pedro Calleja & Francesc Llerena, 2017. "Rationality, aggregate monotonicity and consistency in cooperative games: some (im)possibility results," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 48(1), pages 197-220, January.
    4. Dongshuang Hou & Aymeric Lardon & Panfei Sun & Hao Sun, 2019. "Procedural and optimization implementation of the weighted ENSC value," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 87(2), pages 171-182, September.
    5. Oishi, Takayuki & Nakayama, Mikio & Hokari, Toru & Funaki, Yukihiko, 2016. "Duality and anti-duality in TU games applied to solutions, axioms, and axiomatizations," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 63(C), pages 44-53.
    6. Wenna Wang & Hao Sun & Rene (J.R.) van den Brink & Genjiu Xu, 2018. "The family of ideal values for cooperative games," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 18-002/II, Tinbergen Institute.
    7. Sylvain Béal & Eric Rémila & Philippe Solal, 2017. "Axiomatization and implementation of a class of solidarity values for TU-games," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 83(1), pages 61-94, June.
    8. Li Zhang & Genjiu Xu & Hao Sun & Wenzhong Li, 2024. "Cohesive players: characterizations of a subclass of efficient, symmetric, and linear values," Annals of Operations Research, Springer, vol. 332(1), pages 765-779, January.
    9. Sylvain Béal & Eric Rémila & Philippe Solal, 2015. "A Class of Solidarity Allocation Rules for TU-games," Working Papers 2015-03, CRESE.
    10. Koji Yokote & Takumi Kongo & Yukihiko Funaki, 2021. "Redistribution to the less productive: parallel characterizations of the egalitarian Shapley and consensus values," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 91(1), pages 81-98, July.
    11. David Wettstein & David Pérez-Castrillo & Inés Macho-Stadler, 2016. "Values for Environments with Externalities – The Average Approach," Working Papers 919, Barcelona School of Economics.
    12. Norman Kleinberg & Jeffrey Weiss, 2013. "On membership and marginal values," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 42(2), pages 357-373, May.
    13. Sylvain Béal & Florian Navarro, 2020. "Necessary versus equal players in axiomatic studies," Working Papers 2020-01, CRESE.
    14. Calleja, Pere & Llerena Garrés, Francesc, 2015. "On the (in)compatibility of rationality, monotonicity and consistency for cooperative games," Working Papers 2072/247807, Universitat Rovira i Virgili, Department of Economics.
    15. Wenna Wang & Hao Sun & René Brink & Genjiu Xu, 2019. "The Family of Ideal Values for Cooperative Games," Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications, Springer, vol. 180(3), pages 1065-1086, March.
    16. Calleja, Pere & Llerena Garrés, Francesc, 2016. "Consistency distinguishes the (weighted) Shapley value, the (weighted) surplus division value and the prenucleolus," Working Papers 2072/266577, Universitat Rovira i Virgili, Department of Economics.
    17. Emilio Calvo Ramón & Esther Gutiérrez-López, 2022. "The equal collective gains value in cooperative games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 51(1), pages 249-278, March.
    18. Macho-Stadler, Inés & Pérez-Castrillo, David & Wettstein, David, 2018. "Values for environments with externalities – The average approach," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 108(C), pages 49-64.
    19. Panfei Sun & Dongshuang Hou & Hao Sun & Theo Driessen, 2017. "Optimization Implementation and Characterization of the Equal Allocation of Nonseparable Costs Value," Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications, Springer, vol. 173(1), pages 336-352, April.
    20. Pedro Calleja & Francesc Llerena, 2019. "Path monotonicity, consistency and axiomatizations of some weighted solutions," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 48(1), pages 287-310, March.

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:spr:aqjoor:v:22:y:2024:i:1:d:10.1007_s10288-023-00538-4. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Sonal Shukla or Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.springer.com .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.