Preserving or removing special players: what keeps your payoff unchanged in TU-games?
If a player is removed from a game, what keeps the payoff of the remaining players unchanged? Is it the removal of a special player or its presence among the remaining players? This article answers this question in a complement study to Kamijo and Kongo (2012). We introduce axioms of invariance from player deletion in presence of a special player. In particular, if the special player is a nullifying player (resp. dummifying player), then the equal division value (resp. equal surplus division value) is characterized by the associated axiom of invariance plus efficiency and balanced cycle contributions. There is no type of special player from such a combination of axioms that characterizes the Shapley value.
|Date of creation:||Nov 2013|
|Date of revision:|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: |
Phone: 03 81 66 65 80
Fax: 03 81 66 65 76
Web page: http://crese.univ-fcomte.fr/
More information through EDIRC
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Ju, Y. & Borm, P.E.M. & Ruys, P.H.M., 2007. "The consensus value : A new solution concept for cooperative games," Other publications TiSEM 6cd44a12-a909-47f8-8d85-e, School of Economics and Management.
- Yoshio Kamijo & Takumi Kongo, 2010. "Axiomatization of the Shapley value using the balanced cycle contributions property," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 39(4), pages 563-571, October.
- Radzik, Tadeusz, 2012. "A new look at the role of players’ weights in the weighted Shapley value," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 223(2), pages 407-416.
- Casajus, André & Huettner, Frank, 2013.
"Null players, solidarity, and the egalitarian Shapley values,"
Journal of Mathematical Economics,
Elsevier, vol. 49(1), pages 58-61.
- Casajus, André & Hüttner, Frank, 2012. "Null players, solidarity, and the egalitarian Shapley values," Working Papers 113, University of Leipzig, Faculty of Economics and Management Science.
- repec:ner:tilbur:urn:nbn:nl:ui:12-195202 is not listed on IDEAS
- Youngsub Chun & Boram Park, 2012. "Population solidarity, population fair-ranking, and the egalitarian value," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 41(2), pages 255-270, May.
- René Brink & Yukihiko Funaki, 2009. "Axiomatizations of a Class of Equal Surplus Sharing Solutions for TU-Games," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 67(3), pages 303-340, September.
- repec:dgr:uvatin:20120136 is not listed on IDEAS
- Kamijo, Yoshio & Kongo, Takumi, 2012. "Whose deletion does not affect your payoff? The difference between the Shapley value, the egalitarian value, the solidarity value, and the Banzhaf value," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 216(3), pages 638-646.
- Casajus, André & Hüttner, Frank, 2012. "Nullifying vs. dummifying players or nullified vs. dummified players: The difference between the equal division value and the equal surplus division value," Working Papers 110, University of Leipzig, Faculty of Economics and Management Science.
- Nowak, Andrzej S & Radzik, Tadeusz, 1994. "A Solidarity Value for n-Person Transferable Utility Games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 23(1), pages 43-48.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:crb:wpaper:2013-09. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Christian At)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.