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Consistency, Population Solidarity, and Egalitarian Solutions for TU-Games

Author

Listed:
  • Rene van den Brink

    (VU University Amsterdam)

  • Youngsub Chun

    (Seoul National University)

  • Yukihiko Funaki

    (Waseda University)

  • Boram Park

    (Rutgers University)

Abstract

A (point-valued) solution for cooperative games with transferable utility, or simply TU-games, assigns a payoff vector to every TU-game. In this paper we discuss two classes of equal surplus sharing solutions, one consisting of all convex combinations of the equal division solution and the CIS-value, and its dual class consisting of all convex combinations of the equal division solution and the ENSC-value. We provide several characterizations using either population solidarity or a reduced game consistency in addition to other standard properties.

Suggested Citation

  • Rene van den Brink & Youngsub Chun & Yukihiko Funaki & Boram Park, 2012. "Consistency, Population Solidarity, and Egalitarian Solutions for TU-Games," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 12-136/II, Tinbergen Institute.
  • Handle: RePEc:tin:wpaper:20120136
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Oishi, Takayuki & Nakayama, Mikio & Hokari, Toru & Funaki, Yukihiko, 2016. "Duality and anti-duality in TU games applied to solutions, axioms, and axiomatizations," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 63(C), pages 44-53.
    2. Yuan Ju & Peter Borm & Pieter Ruys, 2007. "The consensus value: a new solution concept for cooperative games," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 28(4), pages 685-703, June.
    3. Hart, Sergiu & Mas-Colell, Andreu, 1989. "Potential, Value, and Consistency," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 57(3), pages 589-614, May.
    4. Thomson, William, 1983. "Problems of fair division and the Egalitarian solution," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 31(2), pages 211-226, December.
    5. van den Brink, Rene, 2007. "Null or nullifying players: The difference between the Shapley value and equal division solutions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 136(1), pages 767-775, September.
    6. Youngsub Chun & Boram Park, 2012. "Population solidarity, population fair-ranking, and the egalitarian value," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 41(2), pages 255-270, May.
    7. René Brink & Yukihiko Funaki, 2009. "Axiomatizations of a Class of Equal Surplus Sharing Solutions for TU-Games," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 67(3), pages 303-340, September.
    8. Sergiu Hart, 2006. "Shapley Value," Discussion Paper Series dp421, The Federmann Center for the Study of Rationality, the Hebrew University, Jerusalem.
    9. René Brink & Yukihiko Funaki & Yuan Ju, 2013. "Reconciling marginalism with egalitarianism: consistency, monotonicity, and implementation of egalitarian Shapley values," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 40(3), pages 693-714, March.
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Calleja, Pere & Llerena Garrés, Francesc, 2018. "Weak fairness and the Shapley value," Working Papers 2072/306979, Universitat Rovira i Virgili, Department of Economics.
    2. Pedro Calleja & Francesc Llerena, 2017. "Rationality, aggregate monotonicity and consistency in cooperative games: some (im)possibility results," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 48(1), pages 197-220, January.
    3. Valencia-Toledo, Alfredo & Vidal-Puga, Juan, 2017. "Duality in land rental problems," MPRA Paper 80509, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    4. Hu, Xun-Feng, 2019. "Coalitional surplus desirability and the equal surplus division value," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 179(C), pages 1-4.
    5. Takumi Kongo, 2018. "Effects of Players’ Nullification and Equal (Surplus) Division Values," International Game Theory Review (IGTR), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 20(01), pages 1-14, March.
    6. Zhengxing Zou & Rene van den Brink & Youngsub Chun & Yukihiko Funaki, 2019. "Axiomatizations of the proportional division value," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 19-072/II, Tinbergen Institute.
    7. Sylvain Béal & Eric Rémila & Philippe Solal, 2019. "Coalitional desirability and the equal division value," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 86(1), pages 95-106, February.
    8. Béal, Sylvain & Casajus, André & Huettner, Frank & Rémila, Eric & Solal, Philippe, 2014. "Solidarity within a fixed community," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 125(3), pages 440-443.
    9. Sylvain Ferrières, 2017. "Nullified equal loss property and equal division values," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 83(3), pages 385-406, October.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    TU-game; equal division solution; CIS-value; ENSC-value; population solidarity; consistency;

    JEL classification:

    • C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games

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